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Aw,
as moral
Rheinhold
once possibilities."
noted, is a1 "compromise
between
idealsNiebuhr
and practical
The same is
true of lawyers' ethics. This Essay explores the terms of our
current compromise by focusing on its institutional context. The
aim is to survey changes in regulatory, market, and socialization
structures that might respond to chronic problems of professionalism. Since its objective is to provide an overview, the following
discussion cannot supply the detailed contextual analysis that would
be necessary to evaluate certain initiatives. However, by pulling
together the main themes of recent commentary on legal ethics,
this survey may suggest better ways of institutionalizing our moral
aspirations.
Discussion begins by summarizing the most frequently
perceived problems of professional responsibility, those that involve
overrepresentation, underrepresentation, and nonrepresentation of
potential client interests. The first set of problems arises where
pressures to pursue client objectives compromise broader societal
values. Other difficulties result from pressures to subordinate client

1. RHENHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 302 (1941).
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interests to lawyers' own needs. A final, but related group of
problems involves issues of distribution: the lack of representation
for a broad range of constituencies who lack the resources or
incentives to address their legal needs. Although this catalogue by
no means exhausts the ethical problems facing the profession, it
offers a representative array of the most commonly noted concerns.
Discussion also focuses on some less commonly acknowledged
difficulties in conceptualizing these problems, which have led to
corresponding difficulties in identifying solutions.
The remainder of the Essay surveys possible responses. Part II
explores changes in regulatory structures, such as admissions,
discipline, and judicial oversight. Part IH summarizes market
initiatives that could increase consumer information and
professional competition in the delivery of legal services. The final
section considers strategies of professional socialization in law
schools, law firms, and alternative forms of bar associations.
Throughout this discussion, the organizing inquiry is how best
to institutionalize ethical behavior: what works, what doesn't, and
what more do we need to know to answer those questions?
Underlying this analysis is the conviction that a fuller realization of
professional ideals will require some fundamental changes in
current regulatory policies, market incentives, and socialization
patterns.
I. PROBLEMS OF PROFESSIONALISM

Problems of professionalism arise from complex interrelationships among socioeconomic incentives, institutional structures, and
professional ideologies. In some instances, these problems involve
violations of existing rules; the difficulty lies in enforcement. In
other instances, the conduct is at least arguably permissible; the
difficulty lies in the content of the rules and in their economic and
ideological foundations.
A.

Overvaluing Client Interests
1. Neutral Partisanship

The central norm of contemporary American legal practice is
one of neutral partisanship; the attorney's role is to advance client
interests "zealously within the bounds of the law"2 regardless of

2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBILrrY

EC

7-1 (1980).
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the attorney's own assessment of their underlying merits. Although
lawyers have certain obligations as officers of the court, these are
quite limited and largely track the prohibitions on criminal and
fraudulent conduct that govern all participants in the legal process.3
This neutral partisanship model rests on two assumptions. The
first is that an adversarial clash between two zealous advocates is
the best way to discover truth and to promote accurate legal decision making. A second assumption is that partisan advocacy provides the most effective protection for individual rights. Each of
these assumptions has generated an extensive critique that is sufficiently familiar to require only a brief summary here.
The first assumption, that an adversarial clash yields accurate
outcomes, is not self-evident. As many commentators have observed, this is not how most countries adjudicate disputes, how
most professionals investigate facts, or even how most lawyers
conduct inquiries outside the courtroom.4
In an adversarial model, the merits prevail only if the contest
is a balanced one-that is, if each side has roughly equal access to
relevant legal information, resources, and capabilities. Yet how
often a fully balanced contest occurs in practice is open to doubt.
American lawyers practice in a social order that tolerates vast disparities in wealth, makes most litigation enormously expensive, and
allocates civil legal assistance almost entirely through market mechanisms. Under these circumstances, one would expect that the
"haves" generally come out ahead.5
Among defenders of current partisan norms, the conventional
"solution" to the problem of unequal advocacy "is not to impose
on counsel the burden of representing interests other than those of

3. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39,
48-76 (1989) (identifying the obligations).

4. As Marvin Frankel has noted:
Despite

. .

. untested statements of self-congratulation, we know that others

searching after facts-in history, geography, medicine, whatever-do not emulate
our adversary system. We know that most countries of the world seek justice

by different routes. What is much more to the point, we know that many of
the rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are not geared

for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the development of the truth.
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1036 (1975).
5. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974). See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 597 (1985).
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his client, but rather to take appropriate steps to ensure that all
interests are effectively represented."' Exactly what those steps
might be have never been satisfactorily elaborated. As subsequent
discussion indicates, inequalities in access have been seriously
confronted only at a rhetorical level.
A related problem involves the inadequacy of enforcement
structures to ensure a fair adversarial contest. Conventional justifications for the neutral partisanship model assume that some neutral
arbiter will sort out competing claims. Yet most lawyers work
outside the oversight of any disinterested third party. Only a small
part of legal practice involves litigation, and about 90% of litigated
cases are resolved without trial. Even in cases involving neutral
decision makers, we have no evidence about the relative effectiveness of partisanship in promoting justice. What we do have are
substantial data suggesting that it fails short in too many circumstances.
Imbalances in representation, information, and resources are
readily exploited under current procedural structures. The recent
proliferation of civility codes and professionalism commissions
testify to a widespread sense that partisanship norms are out of
control. Surveys of discovery practices suggest the frequency of
problems. In large, complex cases, lawyers report chronic abuses:
"[T]he average litigant is over-discovered.., overcharged, overexposed and over-wrought."7 In one in-depth study, 62% of Chicago litigators complained about over-discovery, 45% complained
about harassment, and 80% complained about incomplete or evasive responses to requests. Lawyers who handled large cases reported that in about half the matters that were settled and in about 30
percent of those that were tried, they had significant information
that was not discovered by opposing parties! Similarly, in a survey of over 2500 litigators, about half of responding attorneys felt
that unfair and inadequate pretrial disclosure of material information is a regular or frequent problem; three quarters believed that

6. Abe Krash, Professional Responsibilithy to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There
a Conflict?, 55 CHI. B. REC. Special Centennial Issue, 1974, at 31, 34.
7. A Businessman's View of Lawyers, 33 Bus. LAW. 817, 834 (1978) (comments of
Lester Pollack); see also Jo 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE LJ. 1643, 1644 (1985) ("[Tlhere can be little doubt that the system is not working very well. Too many cases take too much time to be resolved and
impose too much cost upon litigants and taxpayers alike.").
8. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are the Problems?, 67 A.B.A. J.450,
451-56 (1981).

670
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incomplete information presents such a problem.' Responses by
those attorneys to a hypothetical question illustrate the problems at
issue. Where a witness admitted lying during a deposition, about
40% of surveyed lawyers saw no need to correct the record before
settling the case if the client would not agree to the correction.' °
Smaller, more qualitative studies reveal a wide range of partisan practices that obstruct the search for truth. Common examples
include: invoking technical defenses to defeat substantively meritorious claims; counseling destruction of inculpating documents before their retention is clearly required; presenting evidence or testimony that a lawyer reasonably believes but does not "know" is
false; adopting strained interpretations of the attorney-client privilege; preparing witnesses by guided tours down memory lane with
predetermined destinations clearly in view; hiring experts based on
the usefulness rather than quality or likely accuracy of their testimony." Even in the absence of any abusive practices, accurate
fact-finding is at best an unintended by-product, at worst an undesired outcome, of partisan efforts. The point of advocacy, as Socrates noted
and subsequent experience confirms, is persuasion, not
12
truth.
The unqualified pursuit of client interests carries obvious
costs: It obstructs the decision-making process, imposes unnecessary delays and expense, and deters meritorious claims. Although
aggregate estimates of the problem vary, some smaller scale studies
are illuminating. The Rand Corporation's analysis of asbestos litigation, for example, found that over a third of total compensation
went for legal fees and costs. 3 The price of partisanship is borne
not just by litigants, but also by the public generally in the form
of higher prices, tax deductions for legal expenses, and governmen-

9. Stephen D. Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations, Interim Report for ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (1983).
10. Id.
11. Rhode, supra note 5, at 600. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 15 (1980) (perjury and witness preparation); PETER W. HUBER. GALILEO'S REVENGE:
JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991) (expert witnesses); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHrE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATrORNEYS AT WORK 117-20 (1985) (document destruction).
12. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFEsSION 110-21 (1993); Anthony T. Kronman, Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE LJ. 955, 959 (1981).
13.- In nationwide litigation, $16 to $19 billion in transaction costs were accumulated to
recover $14 to $16 billion for injured plaintiffs. INSTITUTr FOR CIVIL JUsTICE, THE RAND
CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT, April 1991-March 31, 1992, at 51-54.
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tal subsidies for adjudicative and administrative proceedings.
In response to such criticisms, proponents of neutral partisanship typically invoke a second line of defense. Whatever its effectiveness or efficiency in promoting truth, this partisan framework is
an indispensable safeguard of individual rights. On this view, respect for clients' autonomy implies respect for their pursuit of legal
claims and demands largely undivided loyalty from their legal advisors. By absolving attorneys from accountability for clients' acts,
the traditional advocacy role encourages representation of those
most vulnerable to public prejudice and state oppression. The
promise of non-judgmental advocacy may also encourage legal
consultation by those most in need of ethical counseling. Any
alternative system, it is argued, would threaten "rule by an oligarchy of lawyers."' 4 To demand that attorneys judge, rather than
simply defend, their clients would be "equivalent to saying that
saints must have a monopoly of lawsuits" and that the lawyers
should have a monopoly of deciding who qualifies for sainthood. 5
From an ethical standpoint, this justification for neutral partisanship presents two central difficulties. First, it conflates legal and
moral entitlements; it assumes that society wishes to permit whatever lawmakers do not prohibit. Yet some conduct that is clearly
antithetical to broader public interests may nonetheless remain
legal-either because prohibitions appear too difficult or costly to
enforce, or because decision makers are too uninformed, overworked, or pressured by special interests. Although lawyers may
have no special moral expertise, they at least have a more disinterested perspective than clients on the ethical dimensions of certain
practices. Attorneys can accept moral responsibility without necessarily imposing it. Unless the lawyer is the last in town, his or her
refusal of the neutral partisan role may simply impose on clients
the psychological and financial cost of finding alternative counsel.
A second problem with rights-based justifications for partisanship is that they fail to explain why the rights of clients should
trump those of all other parties whose interests are inadequately
represented. This failure is most apparent when the client is a well-

14. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. L 613, 617.
15. This phrase comes from an exchange between Samuel Bowles and David Dudley
Field concerning Field's defense of two notorious robber barons. Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and
Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 191, 199 (1977).
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heeled organization squaring off against an outmatched individual. 6 Particularly where health and safety interests are at issue,
partisanship on behalf of corporate profits has often ill-served values of human dignity and autonomy. The Dalkon shield and asbes-

tos litigations offer illustrative case histories of the misery to which
unqualified advocacy has contributed.17 In other less dramatic contexts, where clients view the risks of liability as small in relation

to potential gains, zealous representation can readily frustrate regulatory objectives. 8
Much of the appeal of rights-based justifications for partisanship draws on the lawyer's role in criminal defense proceedings.
Yet such proceedings are distinctive in their potential for govern-

mental oppression and in their impact on individual life, liberty,
and reputation. For the same reasons that our constitutional tradi-

tions impose special protections for criminal cases, most commentators suggest that the justifications for neutral partisanship are strongest in that context. 9 To be sure, in some civil matters, the potential for state action or the constraints on fundamental rights raise
concerns analogous to those at issue in criminal proceedings. Yet
while zealous advocacy has been of enormous importance in such

civil cases, they do not constitute the mainstay of legal work. Only
a small portion of the bar is primarily involved either in criminal
16. Douglas Rosenthal's study of personal injury litigation offers a case in point. As
one of the defense lawyers for an insurance company explains:
Frankly, we are in business to wear out plaintiffs ....

We're not a charity

out to protect the plaintiff's welfare. Take the case I was trying today. The
other lawyer . . . doesn't know what he's doing. His client's got a good claim
for a fractured skull. I want this bastard to win . . . and he'll blow it. Today
I laid the foundation for contributory negligence. which is very doubtful, and
the other lawyer made no attempt to knock it down. The plaintiff is a sweet,
gentle guy-a Puerto Rican. I met him in the john at recess and I told him
that there was nothing personal in my working against him, that I was just
doing my job .

. .

. It's not my fault, I want him to win. It's his lawyer's

fault and his own fault for not getting a better lawyer like me.
DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:. WHO'S IN CHARGE? 82-83 (1974).
17. See generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIsCONDUcT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985); SUSAN PERRY & JIM DAWSON,
DALKON SHIELD 208 (1985).

NIGHTMARE: WOMEN

AND THE

18. See Robert H. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1. 72
(1988).
19. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers
as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 9-10 (1975) (noting that criminal
defendants ought to be judged by the jury and not by the defendant's lawyer). But see
William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense 91, MtcH. L. REv. 1703 (1993) (criticizing the traditional civilcriminal distinction).
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defense or in civil rights, civil liberties, and public interest representation. Professional norms that are appropriate in those cases can
hardly serve as the paradigm for all legal practice.
2. Confidentiality
A corollary of the neutral partisanship principle is that of
confidentiality. Arguments supporting broad protection for client
communications track the instrumental and rights-based justifications noted above. By encouraging individuals to seek legal advice
and to disclose relevant information, the attorney-client privilege
and related ethical rules facilitate compliance with legal norms and
appropriate resolution of legal disputes. In addition, an assurance of
confidentiality both enables individuals to assert legal rights and
preserves specific entitlements such as those concerning privacy,
effective assistance of counsel, and protections against self-incrimination.
Yet these arguments, however persuasive in the abstract, fail
to justify the current scope of confidentiality protections. In general, bar ethical codes prohibit lawyers from revealing information
related to client representation except under certain limited circumstances. Both the Model Code and Model Rules permit lawyers to
reveal confidences if required by law or court order and if necessary to collect a fee or to defend themselves from accusations of
wrongful conduct' The Code allows a lawyer to reveal "the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."2' The Model Rules permit but do not
require lawyers to disclose confidential information "to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ...

to prevent the client

from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Some
states have modified Code or Model Rule provisions by calling on
lawyers to rectify frauds perpetrated during the course of representation or to disclose life-threatening conductL' In most jurisdictions, however, past crimes, torts, and non-criminal but life-threatening acts must remain confidential.

20. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(2), (4); MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 & cmt. (1983).
21. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(3) (footnote omitted).
22. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
23. See ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESsIoNAL CONDUCT 104-10 (1993)
[hereinafter ABAIBNA MANUAL] (listing each state's version of the clause).
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It is by no means obvious that such sweeping mandates are
essential for adequate legal representation. Current rules have exceptions and indeterminacies that few clients comprehend; existing

research leaves doubt that adding certain further qualifications
would significantly alter client behavior.24 Moreover, whatever the
rules, many individuals will be unwilling to trust their lawyers with

compromising disclosures. 5 In those cases, attorneys will often
find independent sources for information, such as documentary
evidence, corroboration by other witnesses, and so forth. Historical,
cross-cultural, and cross-professional research makes clear that

practitioners have long provided counseling on confidential matters
without the sweeping protections from disclosure that the American
bar has now obtained.

6

Although the costs of such protections are difficult to quantify,
some indications emerge from reported cases, bar committee opin-

ions, and survey data. Many innocent investors have suffered substantial losses as a result of attorneys' failure to disclose client
fraud." The recent savings and loan debacles offer multiple exam-

ples; as experts have noted, many of those disasters would not
have occurred without the assistance of lawyers, who provided little
or no resistance to abusive activity.'

24. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 224-53 (1992), and
sources cited therein; Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege: A
Study of the Participants,63 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 191 (1989); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 382-83 (1989) (finding that clients are unaware
of confidentiality rules); Corporate Legal Ethics-An Empirical Study: The Model Rules,
The Code of Professional Responsibility, and Counsel's Continuing Stnggle Benveen Theory and Practice, 8 J. CORP. L. 601 (1983). For a review of these studies and a critique
of current confidentiality rules in the corporate context, see Elizabeth G. Thorburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 157 (1993).
25. See generally JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMtNAL JUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECrIVE (1972); Harry . Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure
of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IowA L. REV. 1091, 1164 (1985) (and sources
cited therein).
26. Rhode, supra note 5, at 614.
27. See Report of the Trustee Concerning Fraud and Other Misconduct in the Management of the Debtor, discussed in In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., 61 B.R. 596, 597 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("massive lease fraud exceeding $100 million"); Stuart Taylor Jr., Ethics and the
Law: A Case History, N.Y. TIMwES, Jan. 9, 1983. § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 31 (attorneys
knew of $60 million in fraudulent loans); see also Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485
(4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a law firm had no duty to disclose client information to
third party investor), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
28. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); Susan
Schmidt, Panel: 'Where Were the Lawyers During the S&L Crisis?', WASH. PosT, Mar.
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Nor has the price of broad confidentiality protections been
only financial. In some jurisdictions, attorneys have persuaded
courts and bar ethics committees not to require disclosure of child
abuse or kidnapping plans in contested custody cases.29 Even
where identifiable individuals' lives have been at risk, many lawyers have felt that their confidentiality obligations trumped competing concerns. In one well-known Minnesota case, lawyers for an
insurance company failed to reveal that their doctor had discovered
a dangerous heart condition that plaintiffs' own medical experts
had failed to discover."
Such cases suggest the extent to which bar ethical rules have
lost touch with ordinary moral intuitions. In one of the few empirical studies on point, clients were much more likely than lawyers to
believe that disclosure was, or should be, required to protect third
parties, and that such requirements would not discourage consultation with attorneys This divergence between public and professional views has also been apparent in bar debates over appropriate
confidentiality mandates. Concerns about lawyers' civil liability
dominated discussion of the proposed Model Rules. Notably absent
from the dialogue was any justification for provisions allowing
disclosures to protect lawyers' own financial interests but not to

preserve other individuals' health, safety, or economic security."

23, 1991, at BI (quoting Harris Weinstein). For a discussion of lawyers' conduct in behalf of savings and loan institutions and the need for regulatory responses, see generally
Susan Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Will,
66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075 (1993); David Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993).
29. Cal. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 1976-37, cited in RHODE &
LUBAN supra note 24, at 241 n.3. But see Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 497-98 (Wash.
1968) (stating that an attorney whose client kidnapped her own child must divulge the
client's address).
30. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). Nor is this an isolated
case. For example, some asbestos company lawyers were clearly aware of the company's
nondisclosure of life-threatening conditions for employees. Saul W. Gellerman, Why
"Good" Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices, in ETHICS IN PRACiCE: MANAGING THE
MORAL CORPORATION 18, 19 (Kenneth R. Andrews & Donald K. David eds., 1989)
[hereinafter ETHICS INPRAC'ICE].
31. Zacharias, supra note 24, at 392-95.
32. See Robert . Kutak, ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Report to the House of Delegates (June 30, 1982), in 1 ABA MATERIALS ON MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt ITEM 400, at 4 (1982) (noting that the confidentiality exception for lawyer-client disputes met with "almost universal agreement"), discussed in Rhode,
supra note 5, at 615 n.96. See generally Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics:
The Making of a Modem Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS' IDEALSILAwYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,

CASE.WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:665

Such provisions highlight more general problems with a regulatory
process under exclusive control of the group to be regulated.
B.

Undervaluing Client Interests

While clients' interests are overvalued in comparison with
broader societal interests, they are undervalued in comparison with
the profession's own interests. Inadequate representation often occurs where clients lack sufficient information, financial resources,
or bargaining leverage, or where attorneys' perceived relationships
with other individuals are more critical than client satisfaction.
Unlike the overvaluation of client concerns described above,
underrepresentation is generally inconsistent with the profession's
stated values. Problems typically arise because those values are not
adequately specified or enforced under existing regulatory structures.
1. Resource Limitations
Underrepresentation is most chronic where neither the client
nor a third party who is subsidizing legal services has sufficient
resources for adequate assistance. In criminal proceedings, the
problem is pervasive. About two-thirds of felony defendants meet
prevailing definitions of indigency and qualify for appointed counsel. Most jurisdictions appoint private lawyers to provide representation under one of two systems: case-by-case assignments or a
competitive contract program in which attorneys bid to provide
representation for an annual fee, irrespective of the volume or
complexity of caseloads. Under either of these systems, fee awards
are quite low; limits of $500 or $1000 are common for felony
cases and hourly reimbursements are well under prevailing market
rates. 33 Some state and federal courts require all admitted attorneys to accept criminal cases despite most practitioners' lack of
expertise and the inadequacy of training and support structures.'
About a third of all jurisdictions have public defender services,
which are almost universally understaffed and underfunded; case-

1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS] (discussing the development of the Model Rules).
33. ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG & PATRICIA A. SMrTH, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS 6-9 (tabulating that 12 statbs have

maximums of $1000 or less) (1986).
34. Albert L. Vreeland, II, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee
Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
626, 627 (1991); see also Marcia Coyle et aW.,Fatal Defense, NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990,
at 30, 32 (noting inadequacies in the states' methods of selecting counsel).
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loads frequently approach 200 felony or 500 misdemeanor cases
per year per attorney? 5 Most individuals who do not qualify for
appointed counsel are just over the line of indigency. They rely
largely on a small number of attorneys who specialize in handling
high volumes of criminal cases, usually for flat fees, payable in
advance?6
As a recent report on indigent representation in federal courts
noted, many criminal defense lawyers "face an inherent conflict
between remaining financially solvent and... [providing] vigorous
advocacy."37 For the vast majority of cases, attorneys face intense
pressures to negotiate plea bargains after little if any work. Privately retained lawyers who use flat fees, court-appointed attorneys
who work at inadequate reimbursement rates, and public defenders
with burgeoning caseloads seldom have any interest in going to
trial. A complex case that does not settle can be disastrous. A
quick plea also spares practitioners the risks and pressures of trials
and preserves good working relationships with other participants in
the system.
Neither market nor regulatory mechanisms provide adequate
checks on such abuses. Bar disciplinary agencies and court appointment systems do not actively monitor performance." Nor do clients typically have sufficient information to second-guess a
lawyer's plea recommendations. Rarely do they have access to
knowledge about prosecutorial, juror, and judicial behavior in comparable cases 9 Even if clients doubt the adequacy of their representation, they generally cannot do much about it. Indigent defendants have no right to select their attorneys, and court-appointed
counsel do not depend 'for their livelihood on the satisfaction of
clients. Non-indigent defendants who have paid a flat fee in advance to private counsel often cannot afford to hire another lawyer.
Malpractice remedies are also inadequate; convicted criminals rarely

35. JERoL H. IsRAEL Er AL., CRIMINAL PRocEnUR AND Tm CotNsnrnoN 25
(1991).
36. Stephen J.Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ. 1979, 1988
(1992) (noting that most attorneys insist on being paid a flat fee up front).
37. Report of the Comm. to Review the Criminal Justice Act (San. 29, 1993), reprinted
in 52 CRIM. LAW REP. 2265, 2284-85 (March 10, 1993) [hereinafter Report].
38. For a discussion of the inadequacy of review, see id. and RHODE & LUBAN, supra
note 24, at 938-41.
39. See Robert E. Scott & William . Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
LJ. 1909, 1959 (1992): Schulhofer, supra note 36, at 1991 (noting difficulties in monitoring counsel's loyalty and performance in plea negotiations).
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make sympathetic plaintiffs, and problems of proving causation and
damages are generally insurmountable. 4° "Mere" negligence does

not trigger bar disciplinary action, and only the most egregious
lawyering will lead courts to find ineffective assistance of coun4

sel. Q

Related problems arise in civil contexts where client resources
or financial stakes are too limited to underwrite fully adequate

representation4

As subsequent discussion indicates, the bar has

sometimes exacerbated the difficulties by blocking efforts to reduce

costs. In other settings, problems of underrepresentation arise from
inherent conflicts of interest. For example, in contingent fee cases,
attorneys' economic interest lies in maximizing the return on their

work; clients' interest lies in gaining the highest possible settlement. Depending on the amount of effort and expense lawyers

have invested in preparation, the alternative uses of their time, and
their degree of risk adverseness, they may be more or less disposed
to settle than their clients.43

40. In some jurisdictions, a defendant cannot bring a malpractice action unless and
until the conviction has been set -aside. E.g., Shaw v. Alaska, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska
1991). In others, the defendant must prove innocence. E.g., Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d
783 (Mass. 1991).
41. See Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 80 (1986) (noting
that failing to investigate is not ineffective assistance); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective
Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 139 (1986)
(discussing difficulties of proving incompetence).
42. City of N.Y. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, WOMEN iN DIvoRcE: LAWYERS. ETHICS,
FEES & FAIRNESS 9-10, 18-20 (1992); Family Law Task Force Says, "Make Pro Se Easier," WASH. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 12, 12 (reporting a finding by the District of Columbia Task Force on Family Law Representation of "an enormous unmet need for legal
assistance to a severely under-served population").
43. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 16 at 95-116 (discussing differences in settlement and
going to trial for attorneys and clients); Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534-78 (1978) (evaluating conflicts
of interest in contingent fee cases); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of The Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L.
REv. 215, 230-36 (1983) (discussing competing interests in class-actions and derivative
suits); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
198-202 (1987) (describing contingent fee conflicts); see also Herbert M. Kritzer et al.,
The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 251, 271-72
(1985) (discussing empirical findings that lawyers working for contingent fees were somewhat more sensitive to the productivity of their time and somewhat less sensitive to client
goals than hourly fee attorneys, but noting that differences were not as great as theoretical
work often implied; professional standards also appeared important).
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2. Lawyer-Client Relationships: Information
Constraints and Bargaining Leverage
In cases where client resources are less constrained and lawyers are working for hourly fees, a converse set of problems arises.
Undervaluing clients' interests leads to overpreparing their cases;
meter running is a practice that lawyers frequently observe and, in
some confidential surveys, acknowledge committing. Here, adversarial psychology and performance anxieties reinforce financial
pressures. Lawyers will often prefer to leave no stone unturned,
provided, of course, that they can charge by the stone.45 A related
and reportedly widespread problem involves charging excessive fees
because of unfamiliarity in the area, without disclosing that unusual
preparation was required 6 Finally, some qualitative research suggests that lawyers' "creative billing" practices are often fraudulent
or on the fringes of fraud: inflating hours, charging two clients for
the same work or the same travel time,' failing to describe the basis
of bills, and so forth.47 Although sophisticated corporate clients

44. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659. 705-09 (1990); William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RYrGEPs L. REv. 1, 3, 15
(1991); see also Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawsyers' Views of Its Effectiveness,
Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (examining the
costs of discovery); Paul Gaynor & Wendy R. Leibowitz, An Empirical Study of
Lawyers' Billing Practices (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting
that one-quarter of lawyers in a national survey of 470 attorneys reported billing more
hours than they actually worked and one-half denied padding themselves but believed that
other lawyers engaged in such conduct); infra note 47.
45. Rhode, supra note 5, at 635.
46. See Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 259, 302 n.185, 307 n.201 (1985) (noting that 89% of surveyed Illinois lawyers
felt that they had lacked sufficient expertise to handle a matter, and only about one-third
of associates frequently or often reduced the amount of time billed to a client because of
lack of productivity).
47. Edward A. Adams & Thom Weidlich, Talk Ain't Cheap, NAT'L. LJ., Nov. 16,
1992, at 2, 48 (reporting that 88% of partners surveyed said they bill for social conversations if the client initiates them on a regular basis but that 96% of corporate executives
indicated that they do not expect to be billed for such conversations). In Lerman's small
study, virtually all of the surveyed lawyers reported deceptive billing practices. Lerman,
supra note 44, at 705-20. In Ross's larger survey, over one-half of corporate counsel and
private practitioners personally knew of some instances of padding, and over one-third
believed that lawyers occasionally engaged in such practices. Ross, supra note 44, at 16;
see also Jonathan L. Kirsch, 'How Do I Bill This: Subtle and Not-so-subtle Pressures
Keep Associates Chasing Billable Hours, CAr LAW., Apr. 1985, at 15, 17 (citing one
practitioner's view that "[f]illing out timeseets is the most creative task" of many of the
partners and associates with whom he was acquainted); Jeff S. Olson, Truth in Billing, 69
A.B.A. J.1344 (1983) (suggesting inflated hours are used to compensate for unrealistically
low hourly rates). For a discussion of the ethical problems posed by common fee practic-
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have become more adept at identifying such practices and have the
leverage or expertise to avoid it," other individuals, particularly
one-shot purchasers, are vulnerable to abuse.
These individuals often lack sufficient information to assess

the quality, competence, or cost-effectiveness of their representation. In an era of increasing specialization where lawyers know
more and more about less and less,49 practitioners who do not
routinely deliver particular services may have difficulty doing so
efficiently. Yet bar ethical codes do not speak to this problem;

they demand only skills "adequate" or "reasonably necessary" for
representation." Nor have courts and disciplinary agencies been

inclined to monitor the fairness of fee agreements except in cases
of clear abuse."

Related problems arise where formal mechanisms of client
accountability are weak and where inequalities of class, race, ethnicity, or gender reinforce professional dominance. So, for example,

lawyers representing diffuse classes in public interest cases, or
establishing priorities for scarce resources in legal service organiza-

tions, may lack incentives to remain adequately sensitive to client
concerns. 2 In other contexts, attorneys who have received little

es such as billing multiple clients for the same hours, see ABA Standing Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 93-379 (Dec. 6, 1993).
48. See Nancy Rutter, The Law Business, CAL. LAW., May 1991, at 26; Shawn Tully,
How to Cut those #$%* Legal Costs, FORTUNE, Sept. 21, 1992, at 119, 19-20.
49. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 531, 608 (1994).
50. The Model Code requires "preparation adequate in the circumstances." MODEL
CODE DR 6-101(A)(2). The Model Rules require "knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation" MODEL RULES Rule I.I.
51. Under the Model Code, the test is whether a lawyer "of ordinary prudence" would
consider the fee excessive. MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B). Under the Model Rules, the test
is whether the fee is "reasonable" MODEL RULES Rule 1.5a. Courts and disciplinary agencies have been reluctant to police fees under either of these standards. See RHODE &
LUBAN, supra note 24, at 753-66; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 516
(1986); see generally Lester Brickman, Attorney Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting
View, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 277 (discussing the problems and merits of fee dispute arbitration).
52. For examples in legal services, see DOUGLAS . BFSHARov, LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THE POOR: TIME FOR REFORM xiv-xvi (1990); Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor:
A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 282 (1982); Cramton, supra note 49. For illustrations in public interest contexts, see Derek A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470
(1976): Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183
(1982). For other examples, see John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 825 (1992).

19941

FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

formal training in interpersonal skills end up talking past the concems that are most central to the client. Studies of matrimonial
practice reveal participants occupied with "two different divorces'"
lawyers with the financial and legal consequences of separation and
clients with the social and emotional ones 3 Divorcing parties are
often depressed, anxious, and unsure of what they want. Attorneys
are often impatient, insensitive, and unresponsive in dealing with
matters lacking direct legal relevance. Lawyers and clients are like
opera performers and their bored but dutiful audiences; lawyers
will not "interrupt the aria but [they will] not applaud much either
for fear of an encore."
Other, more general research reveals a similar mismatch between professional and public concerns. Clients place highest value
on lawyers' responsiveness to their needs as measured by "attentiveness, capacity and willingness to communicate, and respect for
[their] intelligence and judgment."' These considerations do not
receive comparable priority in professional education and regulatory
structures.
3. Collegial Relationships
Inadequate representation of client interests is also common
where lawyers place priority on maintaining good relationships with
other members of their community or participants in the legal
process. If zealous pursuit of any single matter will antagonize
individuals whose continuing cooperation or client referrals is important, attorneys may adjust their partisansup accordingly For
example, lawyers in surveyed consumer protection cases have often
accommodated business opponents' concerns rather than maximized
client objectives.' Practitioners in small towns have similarly reported foregoing strategies that would generate ill will among opposing lawyers and established interests.5 Crimnnal defense attor53. Austin Sarat & William L.P. Felstiner, Lmv and Social Relations: Vocabularies of
Motive in LawyerlClient Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 737, 766 (1988).
54. Id. at 750.
55. Barbara A. Curran, Surveying the Legal Needs of the Public? What the Public
Wants and Expects in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in LAW IN A CYNICAL SOCIETY:
OPINION AND LAW INTH"E 1980's 107, 104 (Dale Gibson & Jane K. Baldwin eds., 1985).
56. For the disciplinary system's inattentiveness to such matters, see ABA COMMISSION
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

(1991) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. Li.. 705 (1981).
57. Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 115, 13641 (1979).
58. DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACr OF CONTEXT ON PROFES-
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neys have sometimes found that retaining the good will of prosecutors and trial judges is more important than securing the best outcome for a particular client.59 There are, to be sure, limits on how
far a lawyer can compromise fiduciary obligations and still maintain collegial respect. But there are also limits on what attorneys
can do without jeopardizing their own workplace relationships and
referral networks.
C. Nonrepresentation of Potential Client Interests
A final set of problems involves the lack of representation for
a vast array of legal needs. Although methods for assessing such
needs are inherently inexact, contemporary surveys give some sense
of the general dimensions of the problem. About half the time
lawyers devote to individual clients serves those with incomes in
the top 15% the population; only 10% of attorneys' time goes to
those in the bottom third.' By their own account, governmentfunded legal aid programs can handle only a small fraction of the
needs of those eligible for assistance, and many other individuals
of limited means cannot realistically afford such services.6 Studies
of low-income households generally indicate that between 50-80%
of their perceived legal problems remain unaddressed.62 A national
study cutting across income groups found that individuals do not
seek lawyers' help for between 30-40% of their personal legal
needs.63
There are, moreover, a wide range of unrepresented interests
beyond those reflected in such studies. Surveys relying on selfreports exclude matters that individuals fail to identify as needs

SIONAL PRACTICE 136-42 (1990); Donald D. Landon, Clients, Colleagues, and Community:
The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Lav Practice, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.

81, 105-09; Austin Sarat, Ideologies of Professionalism: Conflict and Change Among
Small Town Lawyers (Aug. 7, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

59. Albert W. Alschuler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 149, 151-52 (1986); cf Schuihofer, supra note
36, at 1989-90 (noting that court officials who appoint for indigent clients favor coopera-

tive lawyers).
60. Joel Handler et al., Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights 101-02 (1978); see
also Barbara Curran, 1989 Survey of the Public's Use of Legal Services 81-89 (May

1989).
61. At current governmental funding levels, legal aid programs receive less than $10
for every person below the poverty line. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 823.
62. The Spangenberg Group, National Survey of the Civil Legal Needs of the Poor 3
(1989); Illinois Legal Needs Study 2 (Oct. 6, 1989).
63. Curran, supra note 60, at 81.
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due to unawareness of legal rights and remedies. Also omitted are
many collective interests involving product safety, environmental
protection, civil rights, and so forth. Given the extremely limited
resources available to public interest organizations, these concerns
remain chronically underrepresented.' Finally, legal needs studies
typically leave out third party concerns, such as those of children
in divorce cases, whose welfare is implicated but generally not
represented in legal proceedings.
Although delivery of legal services is not the focus of this
Essay, neither can any adequate discussion of legal ethics fail to
acknowledge certain central distributional issues. First, in a society
at least in principle committed to equal justice under the law, the
absence of adequate representation poses obvious dilemmas for
lawyers in adversarial contexts. Second, the bar has itself compounded problems of inadequate assistance by invoking ethical
concerns when resisting lay competition and procedural reforms.
Such resistance has blocked changes that would minimize the need
for lawyers in areas such as uncontested divorce, probate, immigration, residential real estate, and auto liability claims.'
Finally, and most importantly, the bar collectively has been
unable or unwilling to grapple with the full implications of these
distributional issues. The ABA consistently has rejected proposals
for mandatory pro bono service, and the vast majority of lawyers
make no contributions to organized legal aid programs.' Within
some segments of the bar, a large part of the problem lies in the
refusal to acknowledge that a significant problem exists. During the
debates over a rejected Model Rules provision requiring pro bono
assistance, opponents offered extensive variations on one

64. In 1989, the Council for Public Interest Law identified 200 tax-exempt, nonprofit
groups that awarded a substantial portion of their resources to the representation of previously unrepresented clients on matters of public policy. These groups employed about
1000 lawyers, less than 1% of the United States Bar. Nan Aron, Liberty and Justice for
All: Public Interest Law in the 1980s and Beyond 55-56 (1989)
65. See Deborah L. Rhode, 7he Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 (Eo. .
LEaAL Emtcs 209 (1990).
66. According to the most comprehensive data available, only 17% of American lawyers participate in organized pro bono programs for the poor. See ABA Consortium on
Legal Services and the Public, The 1989 Directory of Private Bar Involvement Programs
182-83 (1989). Most of lawyers' pro bono work is designed to accommodate existing or
potential clients or to foster lawyers' reputation and collegial relationships through bar
organizations. For a discussion of the bar's contributions and defeated Model Rules provisions, see RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 872-73; Roger Cramton, Mandatory Pro
Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1121-24 (1991).
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commentator's theme: "I know of no person or worthy cause that
has been refused legal service in [this county], regardless of the
ability to pay .... I have no reason to believe the same is not

true of every other county of our state." 67
Moreover, even lawyers who acknowledge the problem of
inadequate access typically ignore its connection to related issues
of professional role. For example, in debates over another unsuccessful Model Rule proposal that would have required lawyers to
avoid exploiting the ignorance of unrepresented opponents, commentators frequently expressed unwillingness to "coddl[e]" those
"too cheap to hire an attorney."'6 In the face of massive
distributional inequalities, bar leaders typically have proposed only
minor reforms, such as modest increases in voluntary pro bono
contributions, legal services' subsidies, and nonlawyer services. 9
D. The Problem with the Problem
These critiques of professional norms have generated a corresponding body of criticisms, which inform the evaluation of possible responses set forth below. However, before addressing particular initiatives, several overarching observations are in order.
Claims about over- and undervaluing client interests typically
rest on an unexpressed and unexplored standard of appropriate
professional representation. Yet consensus on that standard exists
only at the abstract level. As the following discussion suggests, the
bar collectively has no shared understanding of what constitutes
undue partisanship or ineffective assistance except in relatively
egregious cases. In a professional context where either too much or
too little client loyalty can result in ethical violations, it is often

67. Rhode, supra note 5, at 609 (quoting Stunz and discussing bar opposition to mandatory pro bono services).
68. Id. at 611 (quoting Parsons).
69. Compare MODEL RULES Rule 3.6 (Discussion Draft 1980) (a defeated rule which

prohibited lawyers from "unfairly exploiting [an unrepresented party's] ignorance of the
law or the practices of the tribunal") with MODEL RULES Rule 4.3 (1993) (requiring that
lawyers avoid implying to unrepresented parties that they are disinterested and that they
should make reasonable efforts to correct evident misunderstandings concerning their role).
For example, in 1993, the ABA House of Delegates resolved that lawyers increase their

voluntary pro bono efforts from -40 to 50 hours a year and devote the majority of their
efforts to the poor. In 1986, the ABA Commission on Professionalism concluded that
"limited licensing of paralegals to perform certain functions seems to be a desirable step,"
and singled out real estate and telephone hotlines as possible areas for reform. ABA
Comm'n on Professionalism, " . . . In the Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 301 (1986).
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difficult to combat one dynamic without reinforcing the other.
Problems in addressing these issues are complicated by several
factors. First, many ethical concerns are inextricably linked to
distributional issues and to limitations in resources available to
clients, opponents, or third parties. It is, however, by no means
clear what follows from that fact. Our nation's rhetorical commitment to equal justice under the law is the kind of unexamined
platitude that prompted Tawney's observation about equal opportunity. He wondered what would "horrify proponents most: the denial
of the principle or the attempt to apply it?"7' Given the elasticity
of legal needs and the disparity of financial resources among the
public generally, equalizing access is an unrealistic aspiration. It
would require not only massive government subsidies, but also the
prohibition of private markets."
Yet once we acknowledge such inequality, some uncomfortable questions persist. What constitutes a fair contest in an adversarial structure? At what point does exploitation of resource
advantages become ethically problematic? To what extent do definitions of competent assistance depend on ability and inclination to
pay? How much claiming and blaming do we as a society wish to
subsidize? Even modest calls to enhance, if not equalize, access
leave most of these sticky points unaddressed. If we cannot reach
agreement on such distributional issues at the societal level, it is
unrealistic to expect consensus within a highly heterogeneous bar
serving clientele of widely varying means.
A final complicating factor is that various psychological tendencies work against professionals' recognition of ethical problems.
One such tendency is "cognitive conservatism." Individuals are
more likely to register and retain information that is compatible
with established beliefs or earlier decisions. 2 A related phenomenon is reduction of "cognitive dissonance." After making a decision, individuals tend to suppress or reconstrue information that

70. ROBERT TAWNEY, EQUATELY 103 (1964).
71. Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REv. 274,
281-83 (1986).
72. See ELLIOT ARONSON, TiE SOCIAL ANIMAL 148 (6th ed. 1992); SUSAN T. FISKE
& SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCrAL COGNITION 149-51 (lst ed. 1984); RICHARD NISBETT &
LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
167 (1981); Craig A. Anderson et aL, Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Ex-

planation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037 (1980); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 76. 97-104 (1993).
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casts doubt on that decision! 3 Accordingly, once lawyers have
determined to represent a particular client, they may become less
sensitive to ethical problems arising from that choice.74
Other cognitive processes push in similar directions. Individuals are more likely to retain information that reflects favorably on
themselves and to form positive impressions of someone on whom
their own success partly depends. 5 So too, the very act of advocating a particular position increases the likelihood that proponents
will themselves come to adopt that position. 6 In many practice

settings, these cognitive biases, together with financial self-interest,
collegial pressure, and diffusion of responsibility inevitably skew
ethical judgment. Such distortions can affect lawyers' sense of

collective as well as personal responsibility. The more closely that
individuals identify with their professional role, the less sensitive

they may become to problems in its normative foundations or
practical consequences.
This insensitivity is exacerbated by common human tendencies
to explain ethical misconduct in terms of individual deviance rather
than institutional constraints.' It is easier to attribute problems of
professionalism to occasional lapses by aberrant practitioners than
to acknowledge failures in market structures and regulatory design.

Yet as the following discussion suggests, it is precisely those failures that require our attention if we are seriously committed to
institutionalizing ethics.

73. See LEON FESSTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISsONANCE 128-34 (1957);

supra note 72, at 202-03; Langevoort, supra note 72, at 103 n.113.
74. For a comprehensive overview of this problem, see Langevoort, supra note 72.
75. For an analysis of biases toward retaining information that makes us "feel good,"

ARONSON,

see THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF REASON

IN EVERYDAY LIFE 86 (1991); Robert P. Abelson, Beliefs Are Like Possessions, 16 J.
THEORY OF Soc. BEHAV., 223 (1986). See generally Jonathan Macy, Civic Education and
Interest Group Formation in the American Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1937 (1993).
For a discussion of biases in situations of dependency, see Ziva Kunda, The Case for
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL 480. 486-87 (1990) (exploring how motivation
may affect reasoning); Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on
Impression Formation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-Driven Attention, and Individuating
Processes, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 431 (1987).

76. Ellen T. Klaus, Psychological Effects of Immoral Actions: The Experimental Evidence, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 756, 762-64 (1978); Macy, supra note 75.
77. NISBETr & Ross, supra note 72, at 3-4, 204; KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRtBuTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 132-34 (1985);
MELVIN LERNER, THE BELWF IN A JUST WORLD 20-22, 118-22 (1980).
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REGULATORY STRUCTUREs

Most problems of professionalism call for changes in bar
ethical codes and enforcement structures. The significance of such
changes should neither be overstated nor undervalued. Revising

formal standards will not of itself recast legal practice; much depends on their level of specificity, the balance they strike between
professional and societal interests, and the effectiveness of sanctions. Moreover, ensuring adequate enforcement presents considerable structural difficulties. Some are inherent in any professional
oversight system. Misconduct is often difficult to detect, prove, and
remedy; the costs of monitoring may be prohibitive; and the same
forces that create the need for regulatory oversight often undermine
its effectiveness. Yet other problems in bar regulation are more
political than structural. These reflect professional dominance over
the codification and enforcement process.
Unlike governance structures in other nations and professions,
regulation of the American bar has remained under almost exclusive control of the group to be regulated. Courts in this country
have asserted inherent authority to oversee the practice of law, and
generally have permitted legislative initiatives only if consistent
with judicial standards: 8 The Committee that drafted the Code of
Professional Responsibility included no lay members; the 13-member Model Rules Commission had only one: 9 Nor were any lay
perspectives included on the bodies adopting those codes-the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates and state supreme
courts.
Interpretation and enforcement of professional rules similarly
remain under professional control. Nonlawyers generally have obtained only token representation on disciplinary bodies and lawyers
have controlled the selection process. Few of these lay representatives have had the backgrounds, resources, or sense of accountability to consumers that would create a significant counterweight
to professional power. Nonlawyer members who lack independent
sources of information or ties to organized interest groups have
difficulty maintaining the "[external] viewpoint they are supposed
to bring.' 380
78. CHARIES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 21-25 (1986)

(providing an

overview of regulation of attorneys).
79. RHODE & LVBAN, supra note 24. at 128. By contrast, the British Royal Commission on Legal Services had a majority of nonlawyers. Ma
80. Sylvia Ostrey, Competition Policy and the Self-Regulating Professions, in THE
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The point is not to question the good faith of the attorneys
and judges who control bar regulatory processes. Without doubt,
most members of the profession are committed to improving the
system in which they work. What is open to doubt is whether the
bar as a whole can rise above self-interest on issues that place its
income or status at risk. Pure altruism may be possible, but the
architects of our regulatory processes generally have proceeded on
a contrary assumption. As earlier discussion suggested, simply
through normal processes of dissonance reduction and acculturation,
professionals may lose sensitivity to interests at odds with their
own. Nothing in the bar's extended history of self-governance
suggests it to be an exception."' Rather, as discussion throughout
this Essay suggests, lawyers' ethical codes have generally resolved
conflicts between professional and societal objectives in favor of
those doing the resolving.82 In part, the problem is one of tunnel
vision. No matter how well-intentioned, lawyers regulating lawyers
cannot escape the economic, psychological, and political constraints
of their position. 3
The problem is compounded by attorneys' unwillingness to
consider it a problem. The American bar's traditional position is
that "[w]hile superficially there may appear to be a tension between professional responsibility and self-interest, in fact, broadly
viewed, there is none." Among bar leaders, debates about professional regulation uniformly assume that professional autonomy is
essential. According to the Model Rules' Preamble, self-regulation
serves the public interest because it "helps maintain the legal
profession's independence from government domination."' Such
independence is, in turn, considered "an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more
readily challenged by a profession whose members are not depen-

PROFESSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (Philip Slayton & Michael Trebilcock eds., 1978).
81. Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689. 691-92 (1981) (citations omitted).
82. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639 (1981); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977).

83. Rhode, supra note 81, at 720.
84. Association of the Bar of the City of New York (July 1. 1987), quoted in Committee on the Profession, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Is Professionalism Declining?, 47 THE RECORD 129, 133 (1992).
85. MODEL RULES pmbl. para. 10 (1992).
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dent on government for the right to practice." 6
Majoritarian governmental control and total professional autonomy are not, however, the only alternatives. Other countries have
established more hybrid regulatory structures. And in at least some
instances, most recently in Great Britain, such structures have resulted in more consumer-oriented reforms than their professionallydominated counterparts.' So too, some state legislators have proposed oversight structures that would remain independent of both
the elected government and the organized bar. One California statute would have established a board under state supreme court
auspices with members appointed by different decision makers and
representing diverse constituencies." Of course, as subsequent discussion acknowledges, such a shift in oversight authority is no
guarantee of effective oversight. Yet it is also plausible to suppose
that a more publicly accountable body could generate a more socially responsive governance structure.
Strengthening professional rules is desirable not only to serve
the socializing functions discussed in part IV, but also to enhance
the usefulness of civil liability proceedings. Although both the
Code and Model Rules disclaim any intent to establish norms
outside the disciplinary process, neither provides convincing justification for that limitation.89 Nor have courts and commentators
supplied one. Civil liability proceedings routinely invoke bar codes
to help establish the standard of appropriate conduct, and that
function should appropriately inform the drafting process."
In addition to changes in ethical rules, regulatory initiatives
are essential on two levels. For the profession generally, more
external oversight is necessary through bar discipline, judicial sanc86. Id.
87. For a discussion of British initiatives designed to promote greater competition, see
Survey: The Legal Profession. THE EcoNOMiST. July 18, 1992, at 3, 15, 17. For a comprehensive account of the improvements in the California disciplinary system after appointment of a state bar monitor and other reforms initiated by the California legislature. see
Report of Stephen Gillers, On Lawyer Discipline, Submitted to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey (Dec. 22, 1993) (on file with author); infra note 127.
88. RHODE & LuBAN, supra note 24, at 953.
89. See MODEL RuLES Scope 6 ("The Rules are designed to provide guidance to
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are nof designed to be a basis for civil liability."); MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement (1983) ("The Model Code . . . does [not] undertake to define standards of civil
liability of lawyers for professional conduct."). For a critical review, see WOLFRAM, supra
note 78, at 48-64.
90. See cases cited in Committee on the Profession, supra note 84, at 147-61 (dialogue
of Stephen Gillers).
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tions, and civil liability proceedings. For lawyers working in organizations, more internal oversight both of client and collegial conduct is needed through firm-specific standards, audit systems, and
whistleblowing provisions.
The point of this overview is not to work through the details
of such initiatives. It is rather to identify certain general considerations that should inform regulatory strategies and then to suggest
how such strategies could address chronic problems of professionalism.
A. External Oversight. Bar Regulatory Frameworks
Formal regulation of the American bar occurs primarily
through admission and disciplinary processes. This regulatory system is misdirected in several respects. It places too much reliance
on entry-level screening for competence and character, and devotes
too little effort to monitoring and remedying misconduct. What
monitoring does occur is overly reactive, inflexible, and self-protective.
1. Admissions
Most jurisdictions' principal tests for professional competence
are the bar exam and a three-year law school graduation requirement. Both methods are over- and under-inclusive. They exclude
individuals with specialized skills who would be perfectly qualified
to provide certain legal services, while providing no assurance that
admitted practitioners are or will remain competent in their chosen
fields. No showing has ever been made that performance either on
bar exams or in law school correlates with performance in practice." Although it is reasonable to infer some relationship, it is
not self-evident that an inflexible three-year educational program
plus a general knowledge test offer the best screening for many
specialties. Nor do states' widely varying exam cut-off scores and
procedures for admitting out-of-state lawyers bear any demonstrated

91. See David M. White, The Definition of Legal Competence: Will the Circle Be
Unbroken?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 641, 683-84, n.190 (1978); see also cases cited in
RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 904-06. For a discussion of the need for better skills

training in law school, see ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, Report of the
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992); FRANCES
ZEMANs & VICTOR ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981); Bryant
G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDuc. 469 (1993).
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relationship to competence.92 The limited data available indicates

that legal education and standardized tests neglect skills that surveyed lawyers find most important, while disproportionately excluding low income and non-white applicants.93 Although some jurisdictions have begun to require continuing legal education, existing requirements (of ungraded participation for a minimal number
of hours) are unlikely to improve performance among those most
in need of improvement.'
Character screening has been similarly misfocused. In theory,
the bar's moral fitness requirement serves two objectives: safeguarding clients and the administration of justice from potential
abuses; and maintaining the bar's public image and a sense of
moral community. In practice, however, the character requirement
subverts or trivializes the ideals it seeks to affirm.
As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, the
definition of character is "unusually ambiguous," and "necessarily
reflect[s] the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the defin-

er."95 Although criteria for exclusion must have a "rational connection" with fitness to practice law, 6 what constitutes such a
connection is widely disputed. Review of judicial and bar committee decision making reveals highly idiosyncratic and inconsistent
judgments, both within and across jurisdictions:
The conventional view has been that certain illegal
acts-regardless of the likelihood of their repetition in a

92. Michael K. McChrystal, Legitimizing Realities: State-Based Bar Admission, National
Standard and Multistate Practice, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 533 (1990); Michael Wines,
At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at B6 (quoting testing expert Steve Klein's conclusion that "standards for passing vary tremendously across states . . . [blut that doesn't
mean people who pass in one state are necessarily better lawyers than those in another,"
particularly since almost all candidates ultimately pass). For a critical review of provisions
concerning out-of-state attorneys, see RHoDE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 936.
93. See ZEMANS & ROSEMNLUM, supra note 91, at 124-28 (finding that the skills that
practitioners found most important included fact gathering, instilling others' confidence,
and effective oral expression, but that these were not the skills that legal education emphasizes, such as knowledge of theory underlying law; the central ability that bar exams
measure, rote memorization, did not even make practitioners' list). For a discussion of the
disproportionate impact of bar exams and law school requirements, see Dannye Holley &
Thomas Kleven, Minorities and the Legal Profession: Current Platitudes, Current Barriers,
12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 299, 305-41 (1987).
94. See Joseph W. Little, Ethics: Political Beliefs and Government Compulsion, 1
PROF. ETics 101, 104 (1992); Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?. 69 GEo. LI. 705, 725-32 (1981).
95. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
96. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
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lawyer-client relationship--evidence attitudes toward law
that cannot be countenanced among its practitioners ....
The difficulty, of course, is that this logic licenses inquiry
into any illegal activity, no matter how remote or minor .

. .

. In fact, bar inquiry frequently extends to juvenile

offenses and parking violations, and conduct warranting
exclusion has been thought to include traffic convictions
and cohabitation.
*..

Violation of a fishing license statute ten years

earlier was sufficient to cause one local Michigan committee to decline certification. But, in the same state, at about
the same time, other examiners on the central board admitted individuals convicted of child molesting and conspiring
to bomb a public building.97
As currently applied, the character requirement is not an effective screening device. Only a tiny number of candidates are denied
admission (an estimated 0.2% of all applicants).98 Although some
substantial group may be deterred from applying, it is by no means
clear that either these individuals or those denied entrance would
have been likely to commit abuses:
[A] vast array of social science research has failed to find
evidence of consistent character traits ....

[E]ven the

slightest change in situational variables dramatically alter[s]
tendencies toward deceit; one [cannot] predict cheaters in
one class on the basis of cheating in another ....

[Most]

findings suggest that the person with a "truly generalized
conscience ...

is a statistical rarity." Although individuals

clearly differ in their responses to temptation, contextual
pressures have a substantial effect on moral conduct independent of any generalized predisposition ....
Although empirical evidence on lawyers' ethics is fragmentary, it also suggests that ....

an attorney's willing-

ness to violate legal or professional rules depends heavily
on the exposures to temptation, client pressures, and collegial attitudes in his practice setting.99

97. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE LJ.

491, 537-38 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
98. Id. at 516.
99. Id. at 557-59 (footnotes omitted) (quoting W. MISCHEL, PERSONALrrY AND ASSESSMENT 26 (1968)).
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So too,°a comparison of bar admission and disciplinary processes raises further doubts about current character screening. From
a public policy perspective, the rationale for bar oversight is stronger for abuses committed after than before licensure. Yet the bar's.
admimstration of admission and disciplinary processes has yielded
precisely the reverse double standard; both substantive and procedural requirements are far more forgiving for practitioners than for
applicants."w But "[i]f certain nonprofessional conduct is sufficiently probative to withhold a license, why is it not also grounds
for license revocation? As long as bar members are unwilling to
monitor their colleagues' parking violations, psychuatric treatment,
and alimony payments, what justifies their reliance on such evidence in screening applicants?"'' °
A regulatory system more attentive to public interests than
professional image should reverse current priorities. Less effort
should center on predicting competence and character; more attention should focus on monitoring actual practices. Admission criteria
should recognize in form what is true in fact: Three years of law
school and passage of a bar exam are neither necessary nor sufficient to secure cost-effective services in many substantive areas,
particularly those involving routine form preparation." The public generally would benefit from a less rigid licensing structure in
which individuals with varying degrees of training competed in the
market for legal services and were subject to more effective performance review and consumer remedies.
Similarly, efforts now spent evaluating the moral character of
bar applicants should be redirected toward regulating conduct of
admitted attorneys. If disqualification for some behavior is necessary to maintain public trust, that behavior should be specified by
publicly accountable regulatory agencies. Standards for admitted
attorneys should be no more lenient than for bar applicants, and
neither group should be subject to the idiosyncratic and intrusive
review that now occurs at the entry level. Bright line character
rules, such as a ban on practice for a specified period after a felony conviction, or exclusion of attorneys disbarred in other jurisdictions, would be preferable to the ad hoc subjectivity of the current
03
system.
100. Id. at 547.
101. Id. at 549.
102. See Rhode, supra note 65.

103. Rhode, supra note 97, at 587.
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2. Discipline and Malpractice
In 1970, a special American Bar Association commission identified a "scandalous situation" in lawyer discipline." Some two
decades later, much in that situation had remained unchanged, as
yet another ABA Commission reported. 5 Fundamental inadequacies in the disciplinary process have persisted in part because of
one central problem that neither Commission acknowledged: the
profession's almost exclusive control over its own regulation. Lawyers have interests that overlap but are not coextensive with those
of the public. Most attorneys want a process that is sufficiently
responsive to clear abuses to protect clients and the profession's
public image, as well as forestall more intrusive state regulation.
But few lawyers have supported a system that would require major
increases in their own bar dues, that would significantly expand
oversight of their own conduct, or that would impose substantial
risks of serious sanctions.
The result is a regulatory structure that rests on inconsistent
premises. Standards governing admission and competition assume
that a free market in legal services is inappropriate; clients are not
in a position to make informed judgments about the quality and
cost of services received. Yet bar disciplinary processes have
worked on the opposite assumption. They rely almost exclusively
on client grievances (together with felony convictions) as sources
of information about attorney misconduct.
Lawyers and judges rarely report professional abuses, -and little
effort has focused on counteracting the obvious economic and
psychological barriers to reporting."6 Many attorneys do not feel
sufficiently blameless to cast the first stone unless they are sure of
a fellow practitioner's serious misconduct. And the incentives to
gather relevant information are almost non-existent. Prosecution of
disciplinary charges poses classic free rider problems. As one practitioner put it when explaining why he had not filed a grievance, "I
represent Ford Motor Company, not the next guy .... I have a

very narrow balance sheet."'0 7 Even lawyers and judges who take
104. See ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft) (1970) (finding
across-the-board failure of disciplinary mechanisms).
105. ABA REPORT, supra note 56.
106. See id. at 92; ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, supra note 69, at 286; RICHARD
ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 144 (1989) (analyzing factors which deter lawyers from reporting abuses).
107. Stephen Brill, Roy Cohn Rides Again, AM. LAW., Mar. 1980, at 5. 5; see also Da-
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a broader view of their professional obligations are often unwilling
to file charges with agencies that have proved ineffective in responding."8
As a consequence, most ethical violations never reach regulatory agencies. Many clients and injured third parties lack information
about attorneys' misconduct or bar grievance processes; others are
deterred by the cost, complexity, or seeming futility of reporting."° Ethical violations from which clients benefit, such as dis-

covery abuse or misrepresentation in negotiations, is also unlikely
to reach oversight agencies.
The system is similarly ineffective in responding to grievances
that are in fact reported. Resource constraints have led disciplinary

agencies to decline jurisdiction over certain abuses for which an
adequate civil remedy is theoretically available, such as "mere"

negligence or excessive fees. The result is a mismatch between
client needs and regulatory responses. The problems that consumers
are most likely to experience, such as neglect and overcharging, are
least likely to fall within agency jurisdiction."' Agencies will also
stay proceedings during the pendency of civil or criminal actions.
In the unusual cases where judges or lawyers report abuses to bar
agencies, those agencies will often refer the case back to the courts
for final resolution, leaving the injured party stranded in between.'
Even cases that fall squarely within bar disciplinary jurisdiction
often fare no better. State agencies are generally underfunded and

vid 0. Weber, "Still in Good Standing": The Crisis in Attorney Discipline, A.B.A. 1.,
Nov. 1987, at 58, 61 (quoting'Geoffrey Hazard Jr.'s observation that reporting misconduct
seems to many lawyers like "buying trouble').
108. See MODEL CODE DR 7-105.
109. ABA REPORT, supra note 56; ABEL, supra note 106, at 144 (reporting survey data
finding that only 13% of clients were aware of disciplinary procedures); Sandra L.
DeBrau & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and Disclosure Advertising: Towards a
New Ethics, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351 (1994) (describing lack of information for consumers);
Robert C. Felimeth, The Disciplinary System of the California State Bar: An Initial Report, CAL. REG. L. REP., Summer 1987, at 1, 5-6 (describing bar referrals and failures to
publicize or even list phone numbers for client complaints).
110. See Kay A. Ostberg, HALT, Attorney Discipline: National Survey and Report
(1990); ABA REPORT, supra note 56, at 9. For a discussion of this longstanding disparity
between agencies' interest in deviance and consumers' needs for dispute resolution, see
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERSUASIVE METHOD
77-78 (1994); Eric H. Steel & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lanyers, Clients, and Professional
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.917, 959-60.
111. Richard H. Underwood, Confessions ofan Ethics Chairman, 16 J.LEGAL PROF.
125, 130-31 (1991).
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understaffed, and over 90% of complaints are dismissed without
investigation." 2 Although some significant percentage of these
complaints are inherently implausible or reflect dissatisfaction with
outcomes rather than attorney performance, the high dismissal rate
is at least partly attributable to inadequate resources. Funding constraints also prevent agencies from undertaking proactive, independent investigations and limit their capacity to assist clients who
need help in filing grievances. In most jurisdictions, the confidentiality of the process, unless some public sanction is issued, means
that attorneys with large numbers of pending or dismissed complaints receive a "clean bill of health" from disciplinary authorities." 3 Bar decision makers have nonetheless rejected proposals
for greater public disclosure out of concern for lawyers who might
be unjustly accused. 14
Concern for clients unjustly exploited has not met with similar
solicitude. Even cases that satisfy the stringent "clear and convincing" standard applicable in disciplinary proceedings often conclude
without adequate remedies. In principle, the objective is protection
of the public, not punishment of the lawyer."' In practice, the
system fails in both respects. Lawyers inevitably experience sanctions as punitive, and decision makers' reluctance to impose them
prevents adequate protection. Less than 2% of complaints result in
public sanctions, and they are rarely directed at practitioners from
mainstream firms and organizations." 6 Here again the mismatch
between client expectations and regulatory outcomes is apparent, as
two cases decided by the same state Supreme Court in the same
year attest. An Indiana lawyer who knowingly allowed marijuana
to grow on his premises was disbarred; a lawyer who "deceived

112. Ostberg, supra note 110; Michael J. Hall & Clyde Leland, The State Bar Court

One Year Later: Is It Working and Is It Worth the Cost?, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 30,
31.

113. See Fellmeth, supra note 109, at 7. Only Oregon permits disclosure of complaints.
114. Don J.DeBenedictis, ABA Adopts Most Discipline Proposals,A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992,
at 28 (reviewing an ABA House of Delegates ruling).
115. ABA JOINT COMMiTrEE ON PROFESSIONAL SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS 17 (1986).

116. See James Evans, Lawyers at Risk, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 45. 46-47; Ostberg,
supra note 110. For examples of the leniency toward established attorneys, see District of
Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (30-day suspension for United States Attorney General who committed perjury in confirmation hearings); Tom
Goldstein, Ex-Partner in a Major Law Finn Is Spared Disbarment, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
1979, at 135 (noting that there was no disbarment for a Wall Street partner who committed pejury).
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neglected his clients' cases
and abused his clients'
7

trust" was suspended for forty-five days.1
In part, this sanctioning structure reflects a "there but for the
grace of God go r' attitude among regulators. Most offenders have
stress-related problems linked to family difficulties, substance
abuse, financial strain, or other work-related pressures;"'

most

decision makers appear more able to empathize with fellow professionals than with clients. Although many regulatory boards have
lay representatives, these individuals never constitute a majority, are
selected by the profession, do not represent organized public interest groups, and generally do not push for more stringent sanctions
than their lawyer colleagues." 9

Although clients may find more sympathy from jurors in malpractice cases, the cost of those proceedings and the difficulties of

proof make them inadequate remedies for most grievances.'20 So
too, many valid civil liability claims go unredressed because the
lawyer has insufficient insurance or personal assets, and the bar's

117. In re Moore, 453 N.E.2d 971, 973-74 (Ind. 1983); In re Holloway, 452 N.E.2d
934, 935 (nd. 1983). These are not isolated examples. See DeBrau & Burton, supra note
109 at 353; Matthew 1. Nasuti, What Does It Take?, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1992, at 10 (letter
to editor).
118. Evans, supra note 116, at 48; Robert C. Fellmeth, Fifth Progress Report of the
State Bar Disciplinary Monitor (Sept. 1, 1989).
119. See BNJAMIN SHIMBERG Er AL, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICrEs 231 (1973) (arguing that the public interest is not served by lay representation);
Harry W. Arthurs et aL., Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism, in 2 LAWYERS
IN SOCiETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 123, 139 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis
eds., 1988) (noting that non-professionals have limited role); Michael Franck, Pifalls in
Lay Control, 59 MICH. BJ. 680 (1980) (noting that lay members on disciplinary boards
generally do not support more severe sanctions than lawyer members); see also RHODE &
LUBAN, supra note 24, at 130-31 (discussing proposals for greater nonlawyer representation); R. E. Olley, The Future of Self-Regulation: A Consumer Economist's Viewpoint, in
THE PROFESSIONS AND PuBLIc POLICY, supra note 80, at 86 (noting that lay representatives who are not accountable to public interest groups tend to lose independent perspectives).
120. Bar data from the late 1980s indicated that over two-thirds of such claims resulted
in no payment. Of those that were successful, two-thirds provided recoveries under $1000
and most involved fairly obvious errors such as missing deadlines, neglecting to file documents, or failing to contact clients and follow their instructions. RHODE & LUBAN. supra
note 24, at 957 (citation omitted); ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional
Liability, Characteristicsof Legal Malpractice: Report of the National Legal Malpractice
Data Center 82-83 (1989). For other research suggesting that successful claim rates may
be higher, but that current remedial structures are inadequate, see Manny R. Ramos, Legal
Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming fall
1994). As Geoffrey Hazard notes, malpractice is only practical for open-and-shut cases or
those involving substantial damages. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L LU., July 6. 1992.
at 15.
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client security funds are woefully inadequate.'
A more effective regulatory system will require a fundamental

rethinking of self-regulatory premises. As previous discussion indicated, some improvement is likely to occur from removing professional control over the disciplinary process. That is not, however,
to suggest that formal reallocation of authority is an all-purpose
prescription for regulatory pathologies. As experience with administrative agencies makes clear, such bodies are often vulnerable to
capture by the groups to be regulated. These groups not only have
incentives and resources for influence beyond those of a diffuse

public, but their cooperation may be critical to agency performance.
The result is often a "friendly" relationship that constrains administrative oversight.1 " Yet where such relationships are absent, the
targets of regulation typically mobilize to alter personnel and poli-

cies or else circumvent their impact." Lawyers, who often successfully pursue such strategies for clients, are likely to be equally
adept in their own behalf.
Moreover, in a context where professional performance is difficult to monitor and a high degree of professional discretion is

essential, some ethic of self-regulation is important to maintain.
The danger of overly intrusive, bureaucratized external structures is
that they may erode the very sense of personal responsibility that

is most central to effective enforcement."

121. Estimates of the number of lawyers without malpractice insurance range from 2045% in a given jurisdiction. See Daniel B.- Moskowitz, Lawyers Cut Back on Malpractice
Insurance as Rates Increase, WASH. POST, July 1, 1991, at F24 (quoting an estimate of
35%); Debra Moss, Going Bare: Practicing Without Malpractice Insurance, 73 A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1987, at 82, 82 (quoting Duke Stem of the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability who estimated 20-45%); Committee to Improve the Availability of
Legal Services, Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (1990), reprinted in 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 755, 809 n.47 (1991) (36% of California lawyers). For client
security funds, see Deborah M. Chalfie, Dumping Discipline: A Consumer Protection
Model for Regulating Lawyers, LOy. CONSUMER L. REP.. Fall 1991, at 4, 7 (noting that
client security funds are limited in amount and by type of claim; often only victims of
theft can recover); James Bennet, Thieving Lawyers Draining Client Security Funds, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1991, at B16 (describing gross inadequacy of funds).
122. Tom DeVos, Toward More Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior, in CORRIGIBLE CORPORAT1ONS AND UNRULY LAW 89-90 (Brent Fisse & Peter A. French eds., 1985);
CASS R. SUNSTEtN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 98 (1990); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
123. See DeVos, supra note 122.
124. For a general account of the costs of such regulation, see EUGENE BARDACH &
ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 320-23 (1982).
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Yet not all forms of external oversight present equal risks of
co-optation or subversion of regulatory objectives. Agencies can
minimize some of those risks by relying on long-term career employees and building public interest representation and accountability into the regulatory process.I"s Moreover, some loss of regulatory control does not necessarily imply a corresponding loss of professional responsibility. To the contrary, most experts on occupational licensure advocate external checks as a means of prodding
professionals to live up to their own aspirations. 26
Even without such a reallocation of control, strategies that
increase public accountability are also likely to increase effectiveness. The California legislature greatly improved state disciplinary
processes by using its power over bar dues to promote essential
reforms and by appointing a state bar monitor to evaluate their implementation." Experience in other regulatory contexts suggests
the usefulness of tripartite frameworks, in which organized public
interest groups assume an official role in overseeing the oversight
structure." Where no adequate organizations exist, the government can encourage their creation through financial support and the
assurance of a significant regulatory function. Such groups could
both create pressure for reforms and monitor their effectiveness in
two areas: in regulatory agencies' capacity to identify misconduct
and in their ability to provide adequate deterrent and remedial
structures.
Expanding regulators' monitoring capacities will require expansion of resources and of proactive strategies. For example, the bar

125. See Wilson, supra note 122.
126. For a discussion of the value of limiting professional autonomy, see ELIOT
FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 137-51 (1970); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRucTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 93, 134 (1970); ELIOT FREIOSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A
STUDY OF THE INSTMMONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 63-80 (1986); Andrew K.

Dolan & Nicole D. Urban, The Determinants of the Effectiveness of Medical Disciplinary
Boards: 1960.1977, 7 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 203, 215-16 (1983); Elton Rayack, Medical
Licensure: Social Costs and Social Benefits. 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 155 (1982).
For a discussion of federally mandated changes in accountants' responsibilities, see DE4 zL
Y. CAUSEY, JR., DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 49-54 (1979); see

also Chalfie, supra note 121, at 8-9 (noting that independent agencies have a measure of
accountability that other systems lack).

127. See Reynolds Holding, Legislators Consider Bill to Eliminate State Bar, S.F.
CHRON., July 27, 1992, at Al; 'Remarkable' Improvement Cited in Bar's Discipline System, CAL. LAW. Nov. 1991, at 78; Report of Stephen Gillers, supra note 87.
128. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAIT-WArrE. RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
Tim DEREGULATION DEBATE 56-59, 88-89 (1992).

700

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 44:665

could improve disciplinary outreach efforts by increasing publicity,
by requiring disclosure of grievance channels in 'lawyer-client retainer agreements, and by providing assistance to complainants.
Regulatory authorities could also initiate investigations based on
malpractice complaints, court-imposed sanctions, and random
checks of trust funds. Increased accountability of disciplinary responses could occur if records and proceedings were publicly accessible. Greater efforts could be made to enforce rules requiring
lawyers to report misconduct, and greater pressure could be placed
on judges to forward similar information. A recent Illinois decision
imposing attorney discipline under such circumstances reportedly
has increased practitioners' willingness to file complaints. 29
At the remedial level, the bar needs more accessible and less
self-protective enforcement structures. Alternative forms of dispute
resolution and mandatory arbitration under neutral panels should be
available (at the client's discretion) for performance as well as feerelated disputes. Serious misconduct should receive serious sanctions. License revocations, extended suspensions, and probation
should be routine responses. They should also be accompanied by
conditions for reinstatement that are likely to provide both client
remedies and societal protection (e.g., restitution, completion of
office management programs, substance abuse treatment, and so
forth). A centralized directory or toll-free phone bank should supply information about lawyers' disciplinary records, and regulatory
agencies should make greater use of publicity to reinforce sanctions. Client security funds should be dramatically increased, and
adequate malpractice insurance should be required.
B. Internal Oversight
Attention also needs to focus on the organizational context of
ethical violations. A growing body of work on corporate compliance structures yields a useful and largely untapped resource for
rethinking bar regulatory structures. In general, this work makes
clear that internal methods of securing compliance work more
effectively than external oversight structures.'3 ° Organizations generally are in a better position to secure information and cooperation

129. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Il1. 1994). Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty
to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations, in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL
L. REv. 977, 992.
130. AYRES & BRAErHWArrE, supra note 128, at 25-35, 93, 106-19; JOHN BRArrHWAITE,
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 57-70, 134 (1989).
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than regulatory agencies. Most people respond better to sanctions
from peers than from more distant authorities, and restructuring

institutional incentives is more likely to secure compliance than
occasionally imposing sanctions.' Organizations employing lawyers could substantially increase the likelihood of ethical conduct
through monitoring and reward structures giving priority to that
objective. Obvious examples include restructured billing incentives,
firm-specific ethical guidelines, explicit reporting channels, internal

education programs, 32and ethics committees that focus on more than
conflicts of interest.
Such initiatives could be required for all employers over a
certain size, or for those whose lawyers have received civil, judicial, or disciplinary sanctions. Where rule violations involve organizational failures, such as inadequate supervision or skewed incentive structures, the organization should be accountable. More inno-

vative penalties and remedial directives, such as those developed
for corporate misconduct, should become standard tools in professional regulation. For example, courts or disciplinary agencies
could require that lawyers who committed malpractice or discovery
abuse submit a regulatory plan to prevent subsequent misconduct
by other members of their organization. Such a plan might include
new educational programs, oversight committees, reporting channels, and so forth. Research on white-collar offenses also suggests
that community service or publicity of organizational sanctions
33
might have greater deterrent effect than prevailing approaches.

131. AYRES & BRAnHWArIT, supra note 128; BRArirwArrs, supra note 130; Toni
Makkai & Valerie Braithwaite, Professionalism, Organizations, and Compliance, 18 LAW
& Soc. INQ. 33, 35, 37 (1993) (describing effects of organizational culture on
professionals' compliance behavior). For a general discussion of strategies for increasing
ethical responsibility in organizational cultures, see David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in an Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2348 (1992).
132. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 165-66. Ethics codes and committees
will accomplish little if they are in conflict with organizational rewards and punishments,
or if adequate monitoring strategies are not in place. See generally Kenneth E.
Goodpaster, Ethical Imperatives and Corporatb Leadership, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE, supra
note 30, at 212, 225; CHARLES S. McCoy, MANAGEMENT OF VALUES: THE ETHICAL DIFFPERENCE IN CORPORATE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 192-202 (1985); Jeffrey Sonnenfeld &
Paul Lawrence, Why Do Companies Succumb to Price Fixing?, in ETIcs IN PRACTICE,
supra note 30, at 184, 192-98; Patrick E. Murphy, Creating Ethical Corporate Structures,
SLOAN MGMr. REV., Winter 1989, at 81.
133. BRNr FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICrTY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS (1983); Peter A. French, Publicity and the Control of Corporate Conduct:
Hester Prynne's New Image, in CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS & UNRULY LAW 159 (B.
Fisse & P. French eds. 1985); see also DeBrau & Burton, supra note 109 (arguing for
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Current strategies of low visibility reprimands for most disciplinary
violations and modest fines for most procedural violations do not
impose the reputational costs or convey the lasting message that
more innovative sanctions might provide.
C.

Whistleblowing

Individuals working within organizations generally find little to
gain and much to lose from exposing misconduct. Harassment,

isolation, blacklisting, dismissals, and denials of promotion are
common consequences." 4 Those who make disclosures outside the

organization typically run greater risks, because the major beneficiaries are also outsiders. 35 For the organization itself, the costs
of external whistleblowing in terms of legal liability and adverse

publicity generally outweigh any gains. The principal exception Js
where illegal or immoral actions would probably come to light
eventually and early disclosure could prevent or significantly reduce their costs. However, in most cases of external whistleblowing,

the benefits run to society generally or to innocent victims, not to
the organization or to individuals who control employment decisions.
Although this asymmetry cannot be eliminated, its consequences
can be somewhat mitigated. Organizations can reduce the circum-

stances in which external whistleblowing is necessary by establishing better internal reporting channels, such as hotlines and audit or

disclosure of sanctions in lawyers' promotional materials).
134. See MYRON P. GLAZER & PENINA M. GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING
CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 133-66 (1989) (describing methods of management retaliation); see also Karen L. Soeken & Donald R. Soeken, A Survey of
Whistleblowers: Their Stressors and Coping Strategies, in Whistleblower Protection Act of
1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office. and Civil Service
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 537 (1987)
(surveying retaliation whistleblowers experienced, how it affected their health, how they
coped and what motivated them to report violations); Linda K. Trevino & Bart Victor.
Peer Reporting of Unethical Behavior: A Social Context Perspective, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J.
38 (1992); OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, BLOWING THE WisITLE IN Tm FEDERAL GOvERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 1980 AND 1983 SURVEY FINDINGS 6, 7 (1984); OFFICE OF MERIT
SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTIONS BOARD,
WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 3 (1981).
135. Terry M. Dworkin & Elletta S. Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the
Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. Bus. LJ. 267, 301-02
(1991); Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationship Among Beliefs, Organizational
Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 687
(1984); Richard P. Nielsen, Changing Unethical Organizational Behavior, 3 ACAD. OF
MGMT'. EXECUTIVE 123 (1989).
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ethics committees. State and federal legislation could extend
protections against reprisal to the vast majority of employees who
currently lack coverage. 36 Courts could similarly expand the common law rights of whistleblowers to sue for reprisals. 37
In cases involving lawyers, courts too often have taken the
opposite approach. Several have dismissed claims either because
state law failed to recognize exceptions to employment-at-will doe-

trine or because the complaint involved communications subject to
the attorney-client privilege.' Such decisions institutionalize precisely the wrong incentive structures. Given all the social, economic, and psychological pressures against informing, some minimum
legal safeguards against reprisal are a crucial counterweight. As a
coalition of legal ethics experts recently and successfully argued in

a major New York case, we cannot maintain commitments to selfregulation unless we protect a lawyer who acts on them.'39

136. Current prohibitions generally cover only civil servants or reports to government
agencies concerning fraud, waste, or statutory violations. Robert D. Boyle, A Review of
Whistle Blower Protections and Suggestions for Change, 41 LABOR LJ. 821, 822-25
(1990); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 135, at 269-85; Stephen M. Kohn & Michael D.
Kohn, An Overview of Federal and State Whistleblowing Protections, 4 ANTIOCH Li. 99,
101-11 (1986). Further legislation could, for example, make it an unfair labor practice to
discharge an employee who reports to management or government agencies activity reasonably believed to be illegal, against public policy, or inconsistent with employer policy.
137. By the early 1990s, about one-half of all jurisdictions allowed employees to sue for
wrongful discharge if they were fired for refusing to engage in unethical conduct. See
Boyle, supra note 136, at 825-27. Protection is necessary in the remaining states, and
coverage should extend to those penalized for reporting unethical or unlawful conduct.
138. E.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that
termination of attorney's services does not fall within narrow public policy exception to. atwill employment doctrine under Texas law), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988);
Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (ul. App. Ct.
1986) (denying in-house lawyer's claim of retaliatory discharge due to confidential nature
of lawyer-client relationship), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Il. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 850 (1987); qf Wieder v. Skala, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding no public policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine), aft'd, 562 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div.
1990), af'd as modified, No. 256, 1992 N.Y. LEXIS 4240 (Dec. 22, 1992) (reinstating
plaintiff's breach of contract claim). But see Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1043 (111.
App. Ct. 1990) (remanding claim for retaliatory discharge); Mourad v. Automobile Club
Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding $1.25 million jury award
for constructive discharge of in-house lawyer who sued for retaliatory discharge and demotion), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991).
139. See Brief of Axnicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants' Appeal, Wieder v.
Skala, N. 256, 1992 N.Y. LEXIS 4240, (on file with author).
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D. Targeting Regulatory Strategies
Any serious improvement in ethical enforcement will require
not only the general redirections in regulatory policy noted above,
but also more structural approaches targeted to specific problems.
The over- and underrepresentation of client interests described in
part I involve different socioeconomic dynamics and require different institutional responses. The following analysis suggests the level
of detail and the range of strategies that are necessary for effective
enforcement.
1. Sanctions for Procedural Abuse
Despite a cottage industry of committees, commissions, and
commentary devoted to curtailing procedural abuse, most remedies
to date have raised as many difficulties as they have solved. Courts
have a variety of sanctioning powers; the most important is Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state court analogues. The rule provides that a lawyer's signature on any filing
signifies that "to the best of the [signer's] knowledge, information
and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," the filing has evidentiary support, is "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," and "is not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." A court that
finds a Rule 11 violation may impose an "appropriate sanction,"
which may include fines sufficient to cover the reasonable expenses
of opposing parties as a result of the violation.
Until its amendment in 1983, the Rule made sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory and imposed no requirement of reasonable inquiry In effect, this earlier version demanded a finding
of subjective bad faith, and that standard was almost never met.'O
After the 1983 amendments requiring inquiry and mandating sanctions for any violation, Rule 11 enforcement escalated rapidly. Motions for sanctions became a standard part of the advocate's arsenal
and generated more of the harassing litigation that they were meant
to deter. The problem was exacerbated by the ambiguity of standards governing "reasonable inquiry," "good faith," and "well

140. Between 1950 and 1983, there were only 60 reported decisions involving nontechnical violations of Rule ii. In the first years after amendment, there were over a thousand.
See RHODE & LuBAN, supra note 24, at 200, and sources cited therein.
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grounded in fact." In one study, almost 300 judges divided almost
evenly about whether to impose sanctions in six out of ten hypothetical cases.14' According to some, although not all research,
courts have exercised their discretion to penalize civil rights plaintiffs. 142

In response to these problems, the United States Judicial Conference proposed, and the Supreme Court approved, further amendments to the Rule. The most significant changes make sanctions
once again discretionary, and create a 21 day "safe harbor" interval,
during which a party notified of a Rule 11 motion can withdraw
the offending papers without penalty. Under these amendments,
sanctions would "normally" be imposed on firms as well as individual offenders.'43
For those concerned with institutionalizing ethics, this history is
instructive in several respects. The first is that it helps to explain
why bar ethical codes have been so ineffectual in response to procedural abuse. Both the Code and Model Rules enjoin lawyers from
asserting frivolous positions or taking positions merely to harass,
but exclude actions that can be supported by a "good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."'" Like Rule 11 before the 1983 amendments, these provisions have proven largely unenforceable in practice. 4 Not only is
the burden of proving a violation unrealistically high, but litigants
have little if anything to gain from referring cases to bar disciplinary agencies. Those agencies generally will not impose fines that
compensate complainants. As noted earlier, most disciplinary systems stay proceedings pending the outcome of related litigation, and
decline jurisdiction over matters where an alternative civil remedy
is available. Yet that alternative is often ineffective, because the

141. SAUL M. KASSwN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11
SANCTIONS at ix, 17 (1985); see also George P. Joseph, Redrafling Rule 11, NAT'L LJ.,
Oct. 1, 1990, at 13, 14 (noting that trial courts have also imposed sanctions for "meritless"
positions that appellate courts have later upheld).
142. KASSiN, supra note 141, at x, 38-39; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyerr?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 869 n.308 (1992) (discussing studies).
143. FED. R. CtV. P. 11(c)(2).
144. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(2); MODEL RULES Rule 3.1. The Code also bans actions when a lawyer "knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injury another." MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(1). The Model Rules
require lawyers to "make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MODEL RumES Rule 3.2.
145. GEOFFREY HAZARD JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND EThICS OF LAWYER-

Inco 428 (1990).
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sanctions that courts generally impose are insubstantial in comparison with the benefits that lawyers or clients gain from abusive
tactics.
As in other regulatory contexts, societal and professional interests in curbing such abuses are not coextensive. Most attorneys'
primary concern is the avoidance of unwarranted sanctions. Ineffectual penalties are of less concern, because lawyers often welcome
the billable hours necessary to respond to opponents' vexatious proceedings. By contrast, the public has a stronger interest in reducing
unnecessary legal expenses. From a societal vantage, current enforcement structures provide too much deterrence for lawyers who
cannot afford to risk sanctions, and too little for lawyers and litigants who can. The most recent Rule 11 amendments speak only to
the first problem. Indeed, returning to a non-mandatory sanctioning
framework may exacerbate the second by further weakening deterrence. A significant curtailment of penalty structures may also be
premature. The major changes in Rule 11 standards are still relatively recent, and the accumulation of appellate precedent could
ultimately prove sufficient to cope with most current inconsistencies
and excesses.
In the interim, an alternative approach would be to strengthen
penalty options to reach those most impervious to modest fines,
while exempting those most vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement. For
example, some commentators have recommended making monetary
sanctions unavailable against plaintiffs suing under one-way fee
shifting statutes, such as civil rights or environmental legislation.
Such an exemption would recognize the legislature's intent to encourage these claims, and the legal, factual, and economic hurdles
that these claimants already face.'46 For cases where enforcement
has been inadequate, appropriate responses could include publicizing
sanctions more broadly, referring violations to disciplinary agencies,
restructuring those agencies' remedial responses, and requiring organizational offenders to institute educational and monitoring pro"' More resources must also be available for judicial overgrams. 47
sight, not only by trial courts but also by magistrates and special
masters.4

146. Wilkins, supra note 142, at 886 & n.383, and sources cited therein.
147. The Committee Notes to the Proposed Amendments to Rule 11 list options including bar referrals and participation in educational programs. ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra

note 23, at 61:177.
148. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges. 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 436-37 (1982)

19941

FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

2.

707

Disclosure Obligations to the Courts

As the preceding discussion suggested, partisan norms too often
skew dispute resolution processes. The challenge lies in structuring
responses that will accommodate two primary concerns. One is to
preserve some measure of confidentiality, candor, and trust in lawyer-client relationships. A second concern is to prevent freeloading.
Overreliance on disclosures from an adversary may result in inefficiency and injustice. One party could end up subsidizing both sides
of a lawsuit, or neither party might prepare adequately.
These concerns do not, however, justify the current absence of
disclosure obligations in most practice contexts.'49 Models for a
more balanced approach are readily available. For example, current
constitutional and ethical rules require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence. 5 So too, Model Rule 3.3 mandates that in ex
parte proceedings, a lawyer must "inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse."'5 Neither of these rules has had the debilitating effects
that critics of disclosure obligations typically predict.
Early drafts of the Model Rules suggest other possible approaches. Initial provisions would have prohibited lawyers from:
initiating actions unless a lawyer acting in good faith would conclude that there is a reasonable basis for doing so; offering evi-

(evaluating strategies that delegate some of the courts' managerial power to magistrates).

149. The Code provides that a lawyer shall not "(c]onceal or knowingly fal to disclose
that which he is required by law to reveal," and shall not "[k]nowingly make a false
statement of law or fact." MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A). Similarly, the Model Rules prohibits lawyers from making a "false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal," and
from failing "to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client." MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a).
A small step toward increased disclosure responsibilities is reflected in a recent
amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; it requires litigants to
exchange certain information without waiting for discovery requests. Such information
includes the names and identities of individuals who are likely to have significant information regarding any claim or defense, a description of any documents likely to bear significantly on these issues, and information regarding any damages claimed and insurance coverage. For discussion, see COMMrTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFt OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 14-15
(1991). Significant changes in partisan norms will, however, require broader changes such
as those discussed infra text accompanying notes 150-58.
150. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); MODEL CODE DR 7-103(B); MODEL
RULES Rule 3.8(d).
151. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(d).
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dence, without suitable exploration, that the lawyer knows is substantially misleading; and failing to disclose adverse facts to a
tribunal when disclosure would probably have a substantial effect
on the determination of a material issue.' Early draft proposals
also would have given lawyers discretion to disclose favorable
evidence to an opposing party and would have obligated them to
correct manifest misapprehensions of fact resulting from their own
or their clients' previous representations." If enacted and enforced, such rules would help give lawyers' roles as officers of the
court more than rhetorical content.
3.

Disclosure Obligations to Third Parties

There are, of course, limits to how much disclosure of client
confidences we can realistically expect from lawyers whose livelihood often depends on client satisfaction. Yet as prior discussion
suggested, we have by no means approached those limits. The
merits of specific proposals have been explored at length elsewhere
and need not be rehearsed here. What bears consideration are simply directions for reform. Where lawyers know or reasonably
should know that illegal client conduct poses a threat of death or
serious bodily injury, they should have mandatory disclosure obligations comparable to those governing other professions.4 Where
lawyers know or reasonably should know that their assistance has
facilitated criminal or fraudulent conduct, they should have to take
reasonable remedial measures, including revelation of confidential
information to victims or to regulatory agencies. And where attorneys representing organizations learn of illegal conduct that the
organization's highest authority is unwilling to correct, they should
be required to make disclosures necessary to serve the
organization's best interest or to prevent serious third-party inju-

152. Id. Rule 3.1(d) & cmt.
153. Id. Rule 4.2 & cmt.
154. For whistleblowing obligations for medical professionals, see Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (1976); Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the
"Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY
LJ. 263 (1982). For engineers, see the 1974 Code of Ethics for Engineers of the
Engineer's Council for Professional Development [hereinafter ECPD], which provides that:

"Should the Engineers' professional judgment be overruled under circumstances where the
safety, health, and welfare of the public are endangered, the Engineers shall inform their
clients or employers of possible consequences and notify other proper authority of the situation, as may be appropriate." ECPD Canon 1, Guideline 1.c, quoted in John Kultgen,
The Ideological Use of Professional Codes, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE 411,
415 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1988).
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ties.5t' Standards of knowledge should be objective; liability rules
should not encourage selective ignorance in contexts suggesting a
need for investigation.
These mandatory disclosure requirements should also be accompanied by discretionary provisions. Their objective should be to
encourage revelation of conduct posing severe risks to third parties.
In areas where regulatory standards have not caught up to demonstrable hazards, protection for innocent victims should be an option
for all responsible professionals, including lawyers.
Establishing such disclosure standards will require initiatives
along several dimensions. Most obviously, we need to alter, supersede, or supplement bar ethical codes. Parallel changes are necessary in substantive laws governing third-party liability. A clear
target for reversal is the approach reflected in a leading federal
appellate decision, Schatz v. Rosenberg.5 ' There, defrauded sellers
relied on a financial statement containing material misstatements
that the buyer's law firm had drafted. When the buyer declared
bankruptcy, the sellers sued the firm and the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of their complaint. In the court's view, lawyers
should have no liability to third parties in the absence of specific
intent to defraud. This decision stands in sharp contrast to recent
cases involving other professionals, who are increasingly held accountable for conscious avoidance of facts indicating fraud.'" If
we are serious about creating market incentives for morality, the
standard for attorneys should be no lower; a small but growing
number of courts have held as much.'$&
A related strategy is to expand compulsory reporting obligations
for all employees, including lawyers, who become aware of unsafe

155. This was the proposal put forth in earlier drafts of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and enacted in some states. See Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the
Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHics
289, 291-92 (1987). For a critical review of current disclosure rules, see id.; Stephen
Feb. 16, 1983, at 4.
Gillers, Lawyers' Silence Wrong, L.A. DAILY J.,
156. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1475 (1992); see also Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Stormes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986) ("rA]n
award of damages under the securities law is not the way to blaze the trail toward improved ethical standards in the legal and accounting professions:').
157. John M. Freeman & Nathan M. Crystal, Scienter in Professional Liability Cases, 42
S.C. L. REV. 783, 852-55 (1991); Rhode, supra note 110, at 619-21.
158. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1992) (under
California law, attorney owes duty of care to investors as well as to client with respect to
fraud by insiders); Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991)
(Michigan law imposes duty on lawyers to investors who rely on information).
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conditions or illegal activity in certain high-risk contexts. More
attention should focus on the. need for such affirmative disclosure
requirements in regulatory settings where abuses have been particularly likely or difficult to remedy, such as those involving banking,
environmental, and safety concerns.
Given the demonstrable inadequacies and inconsistencies in state
oversight structures, administrative agencies should also assert greater authority to discipline lawyers who practice before them.'59
Where agencies lack such power, state and federal legislation
should authorize its exercise, subject to due process constraints. 16°
Sanctions should be flexible and should include a range of proactive remedies, such as requiring firms to establish internal education
and monitoring structures.
4. Fee Structures
Changing partisan norms will require more than changes in
formal rules and liability structures; it will also depend on changes
in billing practices. As noted earlier, hourly fee structures can encourage both overrepresentation and underrepresentation of client
interests. In a time-based billing system, strategies that prolong
proceedings almost always benefit the lawyer, only sometimes benefit the client, and even less frequently benefit the public. The problem is exacerbated by unrealistic billable hour requirements and
undemanding regulatory structures.
At an increasing number of firms, annual billable hour requirements exceed 2000 hours, and the additional work required to generate billable time makes for unduly demanding schedules. Experts
generally agree that the hourly minimums at many law firms are
unattainable without making "very liberal allowances" for the way
in which time is recorded.' Similar allowances are often made in
assessing clients' "needs" and staffing their cases. Policing through
normal market mechanisms is not always effective because consumers lack information about how best to achieve certain objectives,

159. See Robert W. Emerson, Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplining of Attorneys Since
In re Carter, 29 Am. Bus. LJ. 155, 208, 264 (1991) (recommending "that the SEC and

securities bar develop a disciplinary formula that moves away from adjudication by a
prosecutorial agency without sacrificing procedures to remove bad or incompetent attorneys").
160. Of federal agencies with disciplinary rules, the SEC is the only one that uses its
rule routinely. Id. at 234, 237 n.384. For a discussion of the Model Rules of Federal
Agency Discipline, see id. at 256-60.
161. Ross, supra note 44, at 14.
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how much time a given task usually requires, how much time their
attorney actually spends, and how cost effective the services are.
Among bar leaders, most responses to these problems appear
obvious but unpalatable. One strategy is to reduce annual billing
requirements to levels that do not invite meter running or padding.
Although this suggestion is typically dismissed as financially unrealistic if not ruinous, it bears note who is doing the dismissing. The
partners who benefit from 2000 hour demands generally earn many
times the national average for lawyers." If these partners' incomes were halved, they would still remain among the nation's
highest earners. Those who would benefit from more humane expectations of billable hours constitute a much broader group. It
includes attorneys who are reluctant to fudge, yet who cannot honestly fulfill current requirements without compromising family, pro
bono, or other commitments. Conventional wisdom just a few decades ago was that lawyers could not reasonably expect to charge
for more than 1200 to 1500 hours per year. What has not changed
is the number of hours in a day." Additional beneficiaries of
more realistic billing requirements would be clients who want to
minimize unnecessary or unproductive services by beleaguered attorneys blearily "going through the motions."'
Although such constituencies do not make natural allies, each
independently could exercise greater leverage. Entry-level lawyers
are becoming increasingly sensitive to quality of life issues. If more
talented applicants and associates voted with their feet, more firms
would likely respond. Overbilling would also decline if clients, trial
courts, and independent audit services continued recent trends towards close monitoring and comparison fee shopping. t s Such in162. The Lawyers Almanac 35, 36 (1993); Fiscal Rewards of the Practice, NAT'L L.J.,
March 26, 1990; The Man Law 40: Profits Per Partner, MANHATrAN LAW., July-Aug.
1991, at 28, 31.
163. James Robertson, The Beginning of the End of the Billable Hour?, WASH. LAW.,
1991, July/August at 7,7 (quoting Eugene C. Gerbart, The Art of Billing Clients, I LAw

OFFICE ECON. & MGMT. 29, 34 (1960)).
164. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.i., Feb. 17, 1992, at 19, 20. As Hazard notes,

"[n]o group can get serious mental vork out of its members" at rates above 2000 hours a
year. Id.; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Lffe in the
Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering 44 CASE

W. RES. L. RV.621 (1994).
165. For examples of judicial policing, see David Margolick, It's the 90s Counselor:
Superfluous Fees Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1992, at B9. For legal audit services, see
Nancy Rutter, The Law Business, CAL. LAW., May 1991, at 26; Sharon Walsh, Lawyers'
Clients Get a Little Cross Examining Bills; Overcharges, Questionable Fees Come Under
Increased Scrutiny, WASH. POST, June 8. 1992, at Fl. For corporate oversight, see Alberta
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creased scrutiny could also encourage alternative forms of task-

based billing that include incentives for efficient services."
Of course, task-based billing can create its own set of problems
if the fees are set at unrealistic levels and if controls on compe-

tence are weak. This is, in essence, the problem in the criminal
contexts described earlier. Here the solution is again obvious but
unpalatable; increased resources are necessary to raise fees and
reduce caseloads. Yet public officials generally win far more support by promising to be tough on criminals than to subsidize their
defense. Still, as even conservatives such as federal judge Frank
Easterbrook have argued, a society that professes the "inestimable

value of liberty," and that is willing to pay more than $20,000 a
year for each individual that it incarcerates, should be prepared to
pay more than $250 to determine whether imprisonment is in fact
justifiable."a7 According to many commentators, if this position is
unpopular with the electorate, that is all the more reason for nonelected judges to require adequate appropriations. Just as we have
depended on courts to set threshold standards for prisons, we need

them to set realistic benchmarks for criminal defense fees and caseloads." '
Neither increased resources nor greater attorney-client control
will, of course, address all of the conflicts of interest noted above.

Even with more adequate compensation and realistic caseloads,
appointed counsel will often have personal and professional reasons

I. Cook, Hourly Billing: A Thing of the Past?, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 31 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR]; Shawn Tully, How to Cut Those Legal Costs, FORU'NE, Sept. 21, 1992, at 2.
166. See Edward P. Liebensperger, A Proposalfor Improving Litigation Team Management: Task-Based Billing, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR, supra note 165, at 153; Jesse
D. Miller, Pros and Cons of Alternative Fee Structures-Beyond Hourly Fees, in BEYOND
TE BILLABLE HOUR, supra note 165, at 85, 88; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 164.
167. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE LJ., 1969, 1974
(1992).
168. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986). cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987) (holding that statutory maximum fees violated rights to effective assistance of counsel in cases involving extraordinary circumstances). Other courts that doubt
their authority to appropriate public funds have refused to hear cases in which counsel is
inadequately compensated or have refused to require counsel to accept appointments. See
State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1142 (1982) (holding that if funds are not available, the accused should be discharged); see also Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972) (allowing counsel to
refuse to accept court appointments to indigent defendants); State ex rel Partain v. Oakley,
227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976).
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to avoid trial. And retained counsel who charge flat fees will still
have incentives to plea bargain cases that defendants might prefer
to litigate. Providing adequate client protection will require more
responsive civil liability and bar disciplinary systems, and more
rigorous standards for assessing effective assistance of counsel.
Greater oversight is also necessary concerning contingent fees.
As noted earlier, in claims with low or modest stakes, contingentfee lawyers often have inadequate incentives to prepare a case thoroughly and to hold out for the highest possible settlement. Conversely, in high-stakes cases, after lawyers have spent substantial
time in preparation, they may be more inclined to gamble for a
large recovery than clients with limited resources and substantial
needs. A related problem is that an attorney's total fee bears no
necessary relationship to the amount of work performed or to the
risk actually assumed. In cases with uncontested facts and large
damages, a standard one-third recovery will provide windfalls for
counsel. Although lawyers frequently defend such recoveries as
essential to subsidize other cases with higher risks, it does not
appear that undue risks are taken frequently enough to justify current premiums."'
How best to respond to these problems is less obvious than
with other fee-related issues. Some jurisdictions have attempted to
prevent lawyer windfalls through a formula granting them declining
shares of net recoveries-for example, 50% of the first $100,000
and 10% of amounts over $100,000.7o This approach, however,
risks overcompensating small cases and deterring lawyers from
accepting large complex claims. Many experts therefore prefer either case-by-case judicial oversight or more complicated formulas
tied both to the amount of time expended and the recovery received.'

169. LESTER BRICKmAN Er AL., REMTNKING CONTINGENCY FEES 20-23 (1994); RHODE

& LuBAN, supra note 24, at 772; Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 99 (1989) (proposing that contingency fees should only be permissible if there is a realistic possibility of
no recovery).

170. Florida Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility, 494 So. 2d

960, 963 (Fla. 1986); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (West 1990); see also Note, New
Jersey's Maximum Contingent Fee Schedule: The Validity of Rule 1: 21-7, 5 RUT.-CAM.
LJ. 534 (1974).
171. See Brickman, supra note 169 (arguing for the inclusion of a risk factor and different rates for trial and settlement); Clermont & Currivan, supra note 43, at 537-50. A
recent proposal developed under the auspices of the Manhattan Institute and endorsed by
a consortium of prominent bar leaders, would provide that in personal injury cases: (1)
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However this issue is resolved, contingency agreements, like
other fee-related practices, require more stringent regulatory standards and more accessible dispute resolution procedures. Current
rules are overly deferential to professional interests. The Model
Code prohibits "clearly excessive" fees, and defines them from the

perspective of a "lawyer of ordinary prudence" who is "left with a
definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee."" 2 The choice of a "reasonable lawyer" rather than the
customary "reasonable person" is particularly instructive, given that

attorneys and consumers have quite different perceptions concerning
the fairness of lawyers' charges. 73 Although the Model Rules require "reasonable" fees, reported cases do not suggest that the
change in terminology has led to significant changes in outcomes." Courts are reluctant to second-guess fee agreements, and
clients are likely to get relief only in egregious cases.17
Such relief is usually difficult and expensive to attain, and for
many clients the costs are prohibitive. Most bar disciplinary systems
decline jurisdiction over fee-related disputes. And although almost

all states now offer fee arbitration programs, the vast majority of
these programs are voluntary. 76 After bar opposition, drafters of
the Model Rules deleted proposed requirements that lawyers partici-

pate in fee arbitration. Predictably, the attorneys most likely to

contingency fees could not be charged against settlement offers made prior to plaintiffs'
retention of counsel; (2) defendants would have an opportunity to make a settlement offer
within 60 days after demand of such an offer, and if accepted by the plaintiffs, fees
would be capped at 10% of the first $100,000 and 5% of any greater amounts; (3) demands and offers would need to be accompanied by discoverable information to assist
evaluation of the claim; (4) when plaintiffs reject early offers, contingent fees could only
be charged against net recoveries in excess of such offers; and (5) if defendants make no
offer within 60 days of demand, contingency fee contracts would be unaffected by the
proposal. BRIcKMAN ET AL, supra note 169, at 27-28.
172. MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B). The California Rules prohibit only unconscionable fees.
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-200(A) (1992).
173. Less than one-third of all attorneys polled by the ABA Journal in the early 1980s
believed that legal fees were too high, while an earlier ABA study had found that almost
two-thirds of the public believed that most lawyers charged more for their services than
they were worth. Compare Law Poll: Fees About Right, Lawyers Say, 68 A.B.A. J. 1562
(1982) with BARBARA A. CURRAN & FRANCIS 0. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
PUBLIC 96 (1974).
174. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5.
175. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 751-67. For a recent sampling of
unremedied abuses, see City of N.Y. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, supra note 42.
176. In the remaining 10% of jurisdictions that offer mandatory programs. de novo judicial review is available. See Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissent-.
ing View, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 277, 278 n.4 (1990).
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commit abuses are least likely to cooperate in their remedy. Arbitration programs are limited in other respects; most are inadequately
publicized and will not consider performance-related issues that
underlie many billing disputes."r A more fundamental problem,
which contributes to all the others, is that the legal profession controls the arbitration structure, constitutes a majority of its decision
makers, and determines the selection of lay representatives. On the
whole, these nonlawyer arbiters have been more sympathetic to attorney than to consumer concerns.
Appropriate responses to these inadequacies are straightforward.
Courts should hold lawyers to more exacting fiduciary standards.
As noted earlier, fee arbitration systems should be mandatory,
should cover performance issues, and should be publicized through
media outreach and disclosure requirements.'79 Nonlawyer arbiters
should constitute a majority of decision makers and should be selected and trained in ways that insure accountability to the public
rather than the profession. The chance of obtaining and enforcing
all of these reforms is likely to be greater if control over the process rests with an agency independent of the organized bar.
5. Class Actions
A final area where greater judicial oversight is appropriate
involves class action litigation. In many contexts, the interests of
some class members run counter to those that counsel wishes to
represent for the class as a whole.' Financial conflicts can also
arise between clients' objectives, which generally lie in obtaining
the best possible recovery for the class, and attorneys' objectives,
which may also include entitlement to statutory fee awards or to a
percentage fee that maximizes the return on their time.'
177. Richard Herbert, Settling Disputes Over Lawyers' Bills, THE LEGAL REFORMER,

Oct.-Dec. 1989, at 16-17.
178. Robert Egelko, Arbitrating Fee Disputes: Mandatory Fee Arbitration May Worry
Lawyers, But It's Not All Bad News, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1985, at 21, 22.

179. For example, bar ethical codes could require that lawyers indicate the availability of
arbitration in written fee agreements or in notices issued prior to instituting fee collection
proceedings. See Herbert, supra note 177, at 17-20. The New York Department of Consumer Affairs also proposed, and the New York Court of Appeals adopted, rules requiring

lawyers to submit to arbitration at clients' requests, to prepare written retainer agreements
specifying fee-related terms in plain language, and to provide a standardized bill of rights
including information on complaint channels. N.Y. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, supra note
42.
180. See Bell, supra note 52; Rhode supra note 52 (discussing the conflict of interest
among individual class members); sources cited infra note 181.
181. See John Coffee, Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Actions, 54
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Representation may prove inadequate under such circumstances
because class members, opposing parties, and trial judges all lack
sufficient information or incentives to raise the issue. Potential dissenters are frequently unaware of likely outcomes until meaningful
involvement is too late. Those who are more knowledgeable may
have insufficient stakes or resources to complain. Opposing parties
are not always able to discover the extent of conflict within a class.
Nor will they typically be interested in drawing the problem to a
court's attention if the likely result would be to multiply counsel.
That is particularly true where opponents could be liable for prevailing parties' attorneys' fees under state or federal statutes.
Although procedural rules and due process standards require
judges to ensure adequate class representation, practical constraints
often discourage active oversight.8 2 In many cases, finding class
representatives or their counsel inadequate will not terminate proceedings; it will prolong them. From the perspective of an overburdened trial court, the prospect of adding new attorneys or subdividlug classes is often undesirable. More is seldom merrier. Multiple
representation generally multiplies problems. More parties mean
more papers, more scheduling difficulties, and more potential for
objection to any given ruling or settlement proposal.'" So too,
monitoring of class representation is often limited to the certification stage, when the range and intensity of conflict is not yet apparent.
In response to these problems, commentators have proposed a
number of partial solutions. One is to require courts to make a
record concerning their responsiveness to class conflicts. To assist
judicial determinations, class counsel could submit statements detailing contacts with class members, and attorneys' fee awards could
be structured to create greater incentives for class members' involvement. Appointment of separate counsel, or guardians ad litem
who represent absent class members at the settlement phase of
litigation, could also become more standard responses to potential
conflicts.' 4 Such procedural checks and balances, while not an
U. CHI. L. Rv. 877 (1987); Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role
of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385 (1987); Jonathan Macy & Geoffrey
Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
182. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23a(3)-(4) (requiring that class representatives "fairly and
equally protect the interests of their class"); Rhode, supra note 52, at 1191-92.
183. Rhode, supra note 52, at 1219.
184. See John Coffee, Rethinking Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L..
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entirely adequate approach, could at least mitigate problems of
underrepresentation for some vulnerable constituencies.
IIH. PROCEDURAL ALTERNATIVES AND MARKET INCENTIVES

Since problems of professionalism are at least partly driven by
market forces, more systematic efforts at market intervention are
necessary. And since the market is itself partly responsive to procedural structures, more carefully tailored dispute resolution alternatives are equally important. To compensate for overrepresentation of
client interests, we need initiatives that will either reduce resource
inequalities or reduce their effect on outcomes. To counteract
underrepresentation of client concerns, we need strategies that will
increase competition among service providers and decrease information barriers among consumers. Although both sets of strategies
require more extended analysis than is possible here, it is important
at least to identify the options available and the research that would
be necessary to choose wisely among them.
A. Alternative Dispute Resolution and ProceduralReform
Many problems of over- and underrepresentation would arise
less frequently under alternative methods of dispute resolution
[ADRI or under simplified procedures that reduce dependence on
lawyers and that restrict opportunities for partisan abuses. Yet such
informality comes at a cost, which varies widely according to the
nature of the procedure and the context of its implementation.s
The safest generalization for reform strategies is the need to avoid
overgeneralizing.
As originally conceived, alternative dispute resolution and procedural simplifications sought to address many of the problems in
adversarial approaches noted earlier: undue costs, delays, and contentiousness; inequalities in access and results; and lack of client
control over the process. Yet, as quickly became apparent, these
concerns often pushed in different directions. And some initiatives
have been co-opted by the very forces that proponents sought to
challenge." 6
625 (1987); Macy and Miller, supra note 181; Rhode, supra note 52; see also Nancy
Morowitz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 Otio ST. L. J. 1 (1993)
(discussing need for clearer standards to accomodate conflicting interests among class members); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U.L. REV.

470, 496-98 (1994) (discussing strategies to promote greater lawyer accountability).
185. STPirEN B. GOLDBERo El AL, DisP= RESmuOLUTION 8-9 (1985).
186. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
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A cottage industry of criticism has identified the gaps between
ADR's promise and performance. For example, compulsory but

non-binding court-annexed programs such as mediation or summary
trials can amplify rather than reduce expenses by adding one more
stage for tactical maneuvers. Workshops designed to assist parties
'4win'at ADR" detail the opportunities.'8 7
Both voluntary and mandatory programs have been criticized as

too available or not available enough. Commentators taking the
latter view note that options such as rent-a-judge, minitrials, and
arbitration are usually accessible only to those who can afford

them. Such a market structure institutionalizes "legal apartheid"-corivenient, speedy justice for the "haves," and delays and

inefficiencies for the "have nots."'88 Creation of a two-track structure may also reduce pressure to reform the system that makes such
alternatives necessary. By contrast, other critics charge that informal
remedies are too often forced on disempowered parties as a form of

second class justice. In contexts of resource disparities, the absence
of neutral adjudicators and procedural guarantees can skew the

balance further. One case in point involved a landlord-tenant court
in the South Bronx, where renters lost tactical advantages under a
streamlined system. 8 So too, mediation between parties of unequal power can often reinforce their inequality; research on custo-

dy and domestic violence programs finds that women negotiate
away rights that should be non-negotiable.' Informal processes
geared toward private settlement may also undervalue societal inter-

ests in having publicly accountable officials implement publicly
acceptable standards. 9 '

Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991).
187. Id.; see also Craig A. McEwen, Pursuing Problem Solving or Predictive Settlement,
19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 77, 86, n.36 (1991) (noting that mandatory mediation in divorce
cases has increased legal fees since lawyers routinely participate).
188. Robert Gnaizda, Rent a Judge: Secret Justice for the Privileged Few, 66 JUDICATruRE 6, 11 (1982).
189. Mark M. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in I
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 119, 128-60 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982).
190. For example, battered wives may agree to avoid nagging in exchange for their
husbands' promises to refrain from physical assaults. Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife
Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV.
WoMEN's L. 3. 56, 57 (1984). For risks to women in other contexts, see Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545 (1991); Janet
Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems 2 LAW & INEQ. J.
21 (1984); see also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359.
191. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984).
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Yet such critiques have themselves prompted an equally powerfil set of rejoinders. As they suggest, the impact of alternative
dispute resolution depends heavily on context. In the housing court
example, tenants were able to exploit procedural options only because of certain contingencies, such as the burden of proof under
applicable eviction statutes and the availability of legal services
attorneys."g Where evidentiary burdens and professional assistance
are distributed differently, the tradeoffs are also different..
Thus, the evaluation of procedural alternatives cannot proceed
in the abstract. 93 Too often, critics of informal dispute resolution
processes compare them to an idealized image of adjudication. Yet
before denouncing such initiatives as second class justice, we need
to know whether first class is likely to be available, and on what
terms. In many respects, the current system already institutionalizes
inequality. And it is surely relevant, if not dispositive, that surveyed
participants generally prefer informal procedures to current adversarial alternatives."9
Despite an increasing volume of commentary, systematic information is lacking on crucial issues. To what extent and under what
circumstances do various procedural alternatives reduce the price of
partisanship, in terms of harassment, delay, distortion, nondisclosure,
and so forth? What structures are most likely to reduce costs, increase party satisfaction, mitigate lawyer-client conflicts, and prevent exploitation of less powerful parties? How do the answers to
these questions vary according to the social situation of the participants and the nature of the interests at issue? What general principles would be helpful in structuring procedural alternatives, evaluating their outcomes, and monitoring the conduct of lawyers?
Further innovation and evaluation are equally desirable for
procedural reforms concerning uncontested matters. Many nations
have far more streamlined systems for handling needs involving
192. William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE

REv. 384, 385 (1985).
193. Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REv. 274
(1986).
194. JANE ADLER, SIMPLE JuTsCE: How LTGATORS FARE IN THE PITrSBURGH LAW
COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 60-85, 83-96 (1983); Mary Duryee, Mandatory Court Mediation Demographic Summary and Consumer Evaluation of One Court Service, 30 FAM.

& CONCILIATION CrS. REV. 260, 265 (1992); Craig A. McEwen & Richard . Maiman,
Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 241
(1981); Alan Slater et a]., Client Satisfaction Survey: A Consumer Evaluation of Mediation
and Inveitigative Services, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 252 (April 1992); see also
Rhode, supra note 193, at 286 & n.53, and sources cited therein.
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simple estates, divorces, auto collisions, landlord-tenant disputes,
and so forth. 5 Structural reforms and administrative support for
pro se claimants could reduce current temptations among overqualified lawyers to overcharge for routine work.
B.

Equalizing Resources

Although, as noted earlier, full equalization of resources is an
unrealistic aspiration, we can address some of the most troubling
disparities by tinkering at margins of the current market.
1. Fee Shifting
The American rule that parties generally pay their own expenses
is a relatively recent and highly exceptional practice."' In almost
every other country, courts routinely award legal fees as well as
costs to a prevailing party. Most evidence suggests that similar
practices failed to survive in America largely out of animosity
toward lawyers." 7 Ironically enough, some opponents of the current American rule want to replace it for the same reason.
The alternatives involve award of fees to any prevailing party
(the English "two-way" fee shifting rule) or only to a successful
plaintiff or defendant (one-way fee shifting approaches). Either rule
can apply across the board (as with the English rule); only for
certain types of actions (such as civil rights); only in response to
certain conduct (such as sanctions for frivolous, unreasonable, or
bad faith claims); or only in a court's discretion under specified
circumstances. In this country, judges traditionally have been reluctant to exercise discretion to award fees, and legislatures generally
have mandated such awards only for plaintiffs in certain actions
that are thought to deserve special encouragement."' Proponents
of fee shifting maintain that its wider use would help deter
195. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 89-90
(1981). See generally JEFFREY O'CONNELL & ROGER C. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NoFAULT AND BEYOND: TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS AND
AILMENTS IN MODERN SocrETY (1975); Cramnton, supra note 49.
196. WOLFRAM, supra note 78, at 918; Frances K. Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Imple-

mentation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 187, 188-89.
197. WOLFRAM, supra note 78, at 918; John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 1213.
198. See WOL RAM. supra note 78, at 927, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects
of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1984, at 139; Zemans,
supra note 196, at 209.
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nonmeritorious claims and encourage small but valid ones, particularly among parties of limited means.
Opponents of routine fee shifting dispute the latter argument.
They argue that the risk of paying two sets of fees would unduly
chill meritorious but not clear-cut claims, and would
disproportionately deter suits by public interest and other
underrepresented groups. In the early 1990s, Vice President
Quayle's Council on Competitiveness revived this debate with a call
for experimental adoption of a two-way fee shifting system in certain federal diversity cases."9
It is by no means clear that any such system would address the
ethical problems of greatest concern here. Experts generally conclude that the overall effects of adopting the rule are impossible to
predict. Too many complex factors enter the calculus. Results depend on cost-cutting incentives, diverse risk preferences, and varied
amounts at stake among both parties and their lawyers.2® Generalizations from other nations' experience are equally risky. In the
United Kingdom, for example, application of the "loser pay" system
is far more complicated than the label implies. Only about 40% of
individual plaintiffs are in fact potentially liable for their opponents'
fees, because of exemptions for claimants receiving .legal aid, and
because of reliance on legal-expense insurance and other third-party
payments (such as from labor unions).20 ' If American courts
adopted a similar two-way fee shifting rule, comparable exemptions
or insurance systems might develop. Indeed, contingent-fee lawyers
might themselves underwrite such schemes and thus remove some
of the deterrent effect that proponents of reform ae seeking to achieve.
As Charles Wolfram notes, the only reasonable general conclu-

199. Dan Quayle, "Isn't Our Legal System in Need of Reform?," LEGAL TIMES OF
Aug. 19, 1991, at 9.

WASHiNGToN,

200. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Over-

view, 1982 DuKE LJ. 651, 666; see also Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis
of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 173;

Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shfting, and the Limits of
Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CoNrEmp. PRoBs., Winter 1984, at 293 (analyzing the
effect of divergent lawyer-client interests and effective lawyer control on fee shifting systems).
201. Herbert B. Kritzer, The English Experience with the English Rule: How 'Loser Pay'
Works, What Difference It Makes, and What Might Happen Here (July 1992) (Institute for

Legal Studies, Madison, Wisconsin, Working Paper, Dispute Resolution Program 11-4).
202. According to one study, the effect of adopting the English approach once insurance
schemes developed might be to discourage only speculative cases while encouraging routine
claims that arm now unprofitable without a fee award. Id. at 14-15.
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sion about altering fee structures is that any such conclusion should
be "viewed with great caution."2 3 We also have "no empirical
evidence that either the integrity or the efficiency of the judicial
process is improved, or indeed affected, by exceptions to the American rule."2"° Before we further expand those exceptions, we
should have more systematic evaluations of the state and federal fee
shifting rules already in place. "°
Although currently available evidence suggests little reason to
adopt loser pay rules for all cases, it does point up the need for
greater redistribution in selected cases. The rationale for one-way
prevailing plaintiff fee awards is much stronger than for categorical
loser pay systems, at least where plaintiffs are likely to have fewer
resources for litigation. "° Even more compelling is the rationale
for more effective sanctions against bad faith conduct."W
2. Financing Litigation
Another way to reduce resource inequalities is to ease restrictions on financing litigation by lawyers and third parities. The current Code allows attorneys to subsidize litigation costs only when
the client remains ultimately responsible."sa The Model Rules are
only slightly more liberal; they permit lawyers to subsidize litigation for indigent clients irrespective of outcome, and authorize
advances to other clients with repayment contingent on the outcome
of the case.' Except in a few jurisdictions, bar ethics provisions
do not permit payment of medical and living expenses that would
enable clients to withstand pressures for inadequate settlements. Nor
have most jurisdictions allowed contingent fees for experts or third
party investments in litigation, although a few courts have permitted
syndicated lawsuits.210

203. WOLFRAM, supra note 78, at 921.
204. Zemans, supra note 196, at 194.

205. There are already some 2000 state statutes and over 100 federal statutes providing
for one-way fee shifts, and Alaska authorizes two-way shifts. Murray L. Schwartz,
Foreivard, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1984, at 1, 4; Note, State Attorney Fee
Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321, 323, 337. See generally Rowe, supra note 198.

206. Rowe, supra note 200. at 679; see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (discussing general justifications for not shifting
fees).

207. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
208. MODEL CODE DR 5-103(B).
209. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(e).
210. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 783 & n.2, and sources cited therein.
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These financing restrictions date to medieval prohibitions on

champerty and.maintenance." The rationale for banning monetary
assistance has been rooted in two concerns; the desire to avoid the
"strife and contention" of unwarranted litigation,212 and the desire
to minimize lawyer-client conflicts of interest. Yet while acknowledging the force of these concerns, most experts believe that current

restrictions sweep too broadly." 3 The risks of conflicts or baseless
litigation are precisely the same as those arising from contingent
fees. And, as earlier discussion suggested, the best response to such
risks is greater regulatory oversight, not categorical prohibitions.
Current restrictions on subsidizing litigation are frequently evaded,
and understandably so. If strictly enforced, they would "paralyze"
entire categories of proceedings, such as class actions and shareholder derivative suits, where no single plaintiff has a sufficient
stake to accept liability for expenses." 4 Bans on humanitarian
medical and living assistance are more widely observed, and thus

more inhumane in effect, particularly for injured claimants lacking
health insurance s
Prohibitions on contingent fees for experts raise similar concerns. 6 Such restrictions increase litigation inequalities among
already unequal parties. It is, of course, true that giving experts a
direct stake in the outcome might enhance their incentives to shade
testimony. But much the same incentives are already present, given
many witnesses' ongoing business relations with particular lawyers

211. Under Blackstone's traditional definitions, maintenance is "an officious intermeddling
in a suit ... by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it." 4 WaILAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-35. Champerty, "a species of maintenance," is a bargain with a party to divide the fruits of litigation in exchange for subsidizing it. Id. at *135.
212. Id.
213. Wolfram, supra note 200; see also Cynthia L. Cooper, Champerty, Anyone?: Modemi Investors Are Trying to Sell Shares in Lawsuits, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1990, at 19.
214. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58
U. CHL L. REV. 1, 98 (1991).
215. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 446 (La. 1976) ("If an
impoverished person is unable to secure subsistence . . . during disability, he may be
deprived of the only effective means by which he can wait out the necessary delays that
result from litigation to enforce his cause of action."); see also RESATEmErT OF THE
LAW GOVERN
LAWYERS § 48(2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991, cmt. d) (permitting a
lawyer to advance a client's living expenses during the pendency of litigation if delay
would otherwise cause a settlement to be based on financial hardship rather than on the
merits of the claim).
216. See MODEL CODE DR 7-109(C); MODEL RuLES Rule 3.4 cmt.
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and the frequent practice of not demanding fees from unsuccessful
parties.2 17 Such sources of bias are often harder to expose on
cross examination than contingent fees. Concerns about skewed
presentations could be better addressed by other mechanisms, such
as greater use of court-appointed independent experts, or more
probing assessment of the qualifications of experts who express
highly unusual views.2 8
Restrictions on financing litigation also require reassessment.
While we may not like the specter of selling shares in lawsuits, we
have already permitted as much in consolidated contingent fee class
actions, where litigation is financed by consortiums of plaintiffs'
counsel." 9 It is not clear why investment in such claims should
be limited to lawyers, whose conflicts are in many ways harder to
police than those of other potential investors. Until we have better
ways to deter tortious conduct, compensate victims, and finance
legal services, we ought to permit more innovative mechanisms for
underwriting litigation.
C. Competition and Information
For those concerned with institutionalizing ethics, strategies that
increase competition are likely to have mixed results. In some contexts, increased pressure to attract and hold business may intensify
pressures toward overrepresentation of client interests. Yet such
competition, if coupled with greater information about the value of
particular services, may also counteract some of the lapses in client
loyalty noted earlier. The more we can control undue partisanship
through regulatory oversight, and the more we can reduce information barriers through market initiatives, the greater will be the value
of competition.

217. See Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 554 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
218. See Burton L. Ingraham, The Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on the Role of
the Criminologist as Expert Witness, in EXPERT WrINEssEs: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE

COURTROOM 178, 180-81 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas Winfree Jr. eds., 1987); Jack
B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 489-92 (1986).
219. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987) (wealthy
plaintiffs' attorneys entitled to repayment of funds advanced but not to threefold return on
investment); see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 120-22, 202-04 (Enlarged ed. 1986); Weinstein, supra note 184.
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1. Information Barriers
Purchasers' ability to evaluate legal services varies widely, and
requires equally varied market strategies. Large-scale repeat purchasers may find sufficient assistance through increased use of audit
services, competitive bidding, and monitoring by in-house counsel.
One-shot or infrequent purchasers have much greater needs for
independent sources of information.
Current bar referral programs perform no screening or evaluating functions, and as noted earlier, disciplinary agencies fail to
disclose information concerning the vast majority of complaints that
do not result in formal investigation or public sanctions. Although
group legal services programs often perform some monitoring functions, their growth has been unduly restricted by bar ethical rules,
particularly those governing financial investment."0 Lack of bar
cooperation has also prevented efforts to provide centralized consumer directories with substantial price and quality information. 2 '
The market in legal services would function far more effectively if
these constraints were removed and if middle and lower income
purchasers had better sources of information about their legal options and choice of lawyers.
Lawyers, individually and collectively, could also help to expand the supply of information through further initiatives. Attorneys
could establish or cooperate with rating and referral networks that
supplied standardized information concerning cost, competence,
client satisfaction, ethical violations and so forth. Disciplinary agencies could do more to publicize sanctions along lines set forth
above. Specialized bar associations could continue the trend among
some organizations to certify lawyers satisfying special competence
standards and to establish selective affiliations of distinguished
practitioners. m As Robert Gordon and William Simon have ar-

220. See MODEL CODE DR 2-103; MODEL RULES Rules 5.4, 5.5(b), 7.2, 7.3; ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 355 (1987). See generally ROGER'D. BILuNGs, JR., PREPAID LEOAL SERVICES (1981); Alec M. Schwartz, Prepaid Legal
Services: Opening One More Door to Justice, in CIVIL JUSTIcE: AN AOENDA FOR THE
1990s 117, 139-40 (1991); WOLFRAM, supra note 78, at 915 (arguing that bar's hostility
to group plans is difficult to understand except as arising from parochial interests of lawyers who fear competitive disadvantage); David A. Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law
Finn?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1.
221. An attempt by Consumers Union to publish such a directory in Virginia is a case
in point. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 682.
222. Organizations that certify lawyers include the National Board of Trial Attorneys,
American Bankruptcy Institute, and the National Organization of Social Security Claimants'
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gued, such organizations could help create a more efficient market
in reputation and a more effective reward structure for ethical per-

formance.
Finally, the bar could sponsor systematic research on the impact
of state specialization and certification programs. Despite the grow-

ing support for such plans, their overall effects on price, quality, or
client satisfaction remain unclear. More adequate data could lay the

foundations for more effective policies on the use of formal specialty credentials in an era of increasing de facto specialization. m
2. Nonlawyer Competition
Traditionally, the legal profession has asserted inherent authority
to define the practice of law, to limit that practice to lawyers, and
thus to determine the scope of its own monopoly. Repeatedly, bar

leaders have insisted that it is consumers, not attorneys, who suffer
from lay competition, and that the "fight to stop it is the public
fight." 4 If so, it is time for the profession to relinquish control
over the war effort. On the relatively few occasions when its opinion has been solicited, the public has strongly supported greater access to legal services by nonlawyers.'

So too, experts on occupa-

tional licensing almost universally believe that reducing barriers to
competition would promote more cost-effective delivery of routine
assistance. '
Prevailing unauthorized practice rules prohibit a sweeping array
of commercial activity.'m Although exceptions to these prohibitions have been increasing and enforcement has been declining, the

Representatives. Don J. DeBenedictis, House of Delegates, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 114.
223. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 24, at 686-87.
224. American Bar Association, National Conference on the Unauthorized Practice of
Lan, 101 (1962) (remarks of former ABA President John Satterfield, quoting Iowa Supreme
Court). For further variations on the theme, see Rhode, supra note 195, at 3 n.2.
225. In one survey, over 80% of respondents agreed that "many things that lawyers handle-for example, tax matters or estate planning ...
can be done as well and less expensively by nonlawyers." BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 231 (1977). For other examples, including public
referenda, see Rhode, supra note 195, at 3-4; Rhode, supra note 65, at 214-15.
226. For a general discussion, see SIDNEY L. CARROLL & ROBERT J. GASTON, OCCUPATIONAL LICESmG: FINAL REPORT (1977); Daniel B. Hogan, The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recommendations, 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 117 (1983); see
also Walter Gellhom, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 16
(1976) (arguing that occupational licensing has resulted in higher costs to the consumer
and has reduced competition).
227. For a discussion, see Rhode, supra note 195, at 45.48; Rhode, supra note 65, at
211-12.
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current regulatory patchwork appears more responsive to professional than public interests. As one consumer advocate has put it,
rules on lay practice reflect little more than "territorial truces between the warring professions" ' What is needed instead is a radical restructuring of the current cartel.
Traditional justifications for bans on lay competition are
"grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of
those who ... render legal services."
This rationale assumes
that existing bar licensing structures are necessary and effective in
guaranteeing such qualities. But as earlier discussion indicates, this
assumption appears unpersuasive, at least with respect to areas
where demand for lay services is greatest. The growing specialization in legal work, coupled with a greater reliance on paralegals
and routinized case-processing systems, undercuts much of the
traditional rationale for banning competition. Law school and bar
exam requirements provide no assurance of expertise in areas involving routine form processing such as divorce, landlord-tenant
disputes, bankruptcy, welfare claims, tax preparation, and real estate
transactions. In many jurisdictions here and abroad, nonlawyers
frequently handle such matters with no apparent adverse effects. 3o
Surveys of federal administrative agencies, consumer regulatory
organizations, reported judicial decisions, and bar enforcement committees generally reveal no significant incidence of customer injury
from lay practice. 3! So too, the only research on custdmer satisfaction finds higher approval ratings for nonlawyer specialists than
for lawyers? 32
Partly in response to such findings, an increasing number of
state courts, legislatures, and bar organizations have begun consid-

228. Alan Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways of
Looking at an Old Question, 4 NOVA LJ. 363, 370 (1980).
229. MODEL CODE EC 3-1.

230. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN & DAviD S. CLARK, COMPARATIvE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 456-57 (1978); MICHAEL ZANDER, LEGAL

SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITY 335 (1978); Rhode, supra note 65, at 215; Rhode, supra

note 195, at 85-90.
231. See Rhode, supra note 194, at 85-86; Rhode, supra note 64, at 216-17, 230-31.
The exception is immigration, where consumers' lack of knowledge of American legal
structures and their unwillingness or inability to invoke complaint mechanisms raise special
concerns. See Rhode, supra note 64, at 231-32.
232. REPORT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON LEGAL TECHNICIANS
Exhibit 2, 3 (1990) (about three-quarters of respondents were satisfied with help provided

by lay specialists, compared to 64% who reported satisfaction with attorneys' help).
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ering proposals to liberalize unauthorized practice rules. 3 Although these proposals generally have been quite limited in scope,
they could pave the way for broader initiatives. Such initiatives
should ensure that the extent of regulation bears a close relationship
to the demonstrable harms of lay practice and to the costs of foreclosing consumer choice. The need for anticompetitive constraints
should be proven, not assumed, and the least restrictive oversight
structures should be tried first. If problems develop, measures short
of categorical bans on lay services deserve consideration, such as
registration, mandatory malpractice insurance, or licensing structures
requiring minimum qualifications.'
In addition, bar, judicial, and governmental initiatives could
provide more assistance to individuals on routine matters. Examples
include expanded pro se clerks' offices, greater public education
programs, and Citizens Advice Bureaus modeled on those of some
European programs. 5 Finally, and most important, control over
policies governing lay competition should not rest with groups to
be regulated or their lawyer competitors.
3. Interprofessional Competition
For particularly disempowered groups, one final way of increasing accountability to client concerns is through alternative
delivery structures. Greater experimentation with vouchers for criminal defendants is an obvious possibility. Under current systems,
criminal defendants with court-appointed counsel report significantly
less satisfaction with their lawyers' performance than parties who
have retained their own counsel, even where there is no measurable
difference in case outcomes. 6 In general, defendants see assigned
attorneys as part of the system, who have "nothing to gain" by
fighting hard; they "[get their] money either way. ' ' 7 These attitudes are well captured by the title of Jonathan Casper's landmark

233. Rosalind Resnick, Legal Techs Face Regulation, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1992, at 3.
234. See Rhode, supra note 195, at 94-96; Rhode, supra note 65, at 231.

235. See Gary Bellow, Legal Services to the Poor: An American Report, in ACCESS TO
JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE, 49, 67 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981).
236. See Roy B. lemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253, 254 n.3, 276.
237. Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have A Lawyer When You Went to Court? No. I Had
a Public Defender, YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION, Spring 1971, at 4, 7; see also JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE

105-06

(1972) (finding that "[n]early 80% of [surveyed criminal defendants] represented by public
defenders doubt[ed] that their lawyer was on their side.").
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article, "Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I
Had a Public Defender.""5 A system that gives defendants some
choice in their counsel is likely to improve lawyer-client relationships and could slightly increase controls over lawyer performance.
How much improvement such a system would bring may partly
depend on the adequacy of consumer information and bar regulatory
systems. Without improvements in current structures, a pure voucher system may offer few objective advantages over a public defender office, which at least provides peer review and insulation from
financial self-interest. But in indigent defense systems that already
rely on largely unsupervised private counsel, giving clients greater
market power might have payoffs in attorney performance. At the
very least, a voucher system with explicit cost ceilings could prove
beneficial by increasing pressure for change. Providing individual
defendants a voucher for $63 is more likely to arouse judicial (if
not popular) concern than retaining a system that covertly provides
that level of resources per case. 9
IV.

SOCIALIZATION

In many ways, the most elusive but also the most important
strategy for institutionalizing professional ethics involves professional socialization. At least in the short term, most of the regulatory and market strategies endorsed above will depend on bar support. To alter professional ethics will require a sustained commitment to that enterprise. No such commitment has been apparent
among much of the bar for much of its history. A crucial first step
in changing professional culture is to change the socialization processes that perpetuate it.
So too, as practitioners themselves generally acknowledge, the
most important influence in resolving ethical issues, apart from
general upbringing, is professional environment.2 This environment is, in turn, responsive to socializing forces that many practitioners also find influential, such as legal education and formal
codes. 24' Although much of professional culture is beyond our

238. Casper. supra note 237.
239. Schulhofer, supra note 36. at 1999 (noting that "[o]ur present methods . . . hide
the real value of defense services afforded the indigent" and "tend[] to approximate [a system] in which there is no meaningful representation").
240. ZEANs & ROSENBLUM, supra note 93, at 173, 194.
241. See id. at 176 (stating that about one-half of those who had professional responsibility courses gave them some credit in resolving ethical issues); Dan Culhane et al.,
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conscious control, at least some forces could, and should, be subject
to change.
A.

Ethical Codes

Over the past half century, as the bar's increasing size, specialization, and heterogeneity have eroded informal regulatory controls,
the trend has been to place greater reliance on official codes. In the
process, aspirational norms have largely given way to minimal
rules. The result does not necessarily reflect what most commentators (or even lawyers) would consider right or moral. And the
danger in diluting the ethical content of ethical codes is that they
will nonetheless pass for ethics. New entrants are socialized to the
lowest common denominator of conduct that a highly self-interested
group will tolerate.
As a consequence, certain crucial functions of professional
codes are undermined or overlooked. Particularly in contexts where
the threat of formal sanctions is remote, an important role of codified norms is symbolic and educational; they can sensitize professionals to the full normative dimensions of their choices. A collective affirmation of professional values may have some effect simply
by supplying, or removing, one source of a rationalization for dubious conduct. Standards pitched at a more demanding level can
reinforce the lawyer who would prefer the ethical course but is
reluctant to appear sanctimonious.242
If professional codes are to serve this role, they must demand a
higher level of conduct than that reflected in current rules. To be
sure, standards that stray too far from lawyers' collective or individual self-interest will seem irrelevant for the resolution of practical problems. But it by no means follows that existing rules have
stretched the limits of what it is reasonable to expect from most
attorneys on most occasions.
As previous discussion suggests, the most fundamental problem
with current codes stems from professional dominance in the drafting process. If, as Roscoe Pound once put it, the ABA is not the
"same sort of thing as a retail grocers' association," 43 self-regulation brings out more of the similarities than the differences. A

Regulation of Professional Conduct Through the Rules of Legal Ethics (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (noting that two-thirds of surveyed practitioners credited
education as helpful).
242. Rhode, supra note 5, at 648.
243. RoscOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUrY TO MODERN TIMEs 7 (1953).
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further problem in bar codification processes stems from the insistence on uniform standards for increasingly diverse professional
settings. The gap in normative expectations between, say, a Wall
Street specialist in takeover litigation and a small-town family lawyer are as important as the commonalities. The push toward universal rules has led to higher levels of abstraction and lower common
denominators in regulatory standards than is desirable for ethical
guidance.
A more promising alternative would be to reduce the
profession's influence in the definition of uniform minimum rules,
and to expand its role in the development of voluntary codes. Some
specialized bar groups have drafted standards that are more specific
and in some respects more demanding than the ABA Code or Model Rules. Examples include Standards of Conduct by the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and the Guidelines On Tax Practice by the ABA Tax Section Committee on Standards of Tax Practice. Such standards, if reinforced by courts, bar ethics committees,
and workplace policies, could encourage more, ethically reflective
decision making.
So too, alternative bar organizations could play a more prominent role in professional reform. Groups such as the Chicago
Council of Lawyers and the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York often mobilize around a progressive vision and could
profitably influence more issues of regulatory policy."
It is, of course, difficult for bar groups to sustain a broad-based
membership, maintain credibility, and pursue policies that threaten
professional concerns as many lawyers currently perceive them. 5
Yet greater opportunities for progress might arise by building alliances with other public interest organizations. Specialized bar associations could also intentionally recruit members who shared convictions about the need for change or who were somewhat insulated
from the most direct pressures of practice, such as academics or
government attorneys.

244. MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CnT BAR AssocIATIoN (1988); Michael L Powell, Anatomy of

a Counter Bar Association: The Chicago Council of LawVers. 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
L 501.
245. Powell, supra note 244, at 529-31.
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B. Legal Education
The importance of legal ethics in legal education has been often
pronounced but never institutionalized. Despite a century's worth of
commission recommendations and ceremonial homilies, law schools
have done little to translate their rhetorical commitments into curricular priorities.246 That failure is apparent in two central respects:
in the way that most institutions marginalize professional responsibility instruction; and in the skewed model of professionalism that
prevailing educational structures reinforce.
1. Professional Responsibility
In the mid 1970s, largely in response to lawyers' role in Watergate scandals, the ABA mandated that all accredited schools offer
instruction in professional responsibility. For the most part, this
instruction now occurs through a required course that is often
viewed as "the dog of the law school [curricula] .. .presented to

vacant seats or vacant minds."'247 Surveyed students have found
professional responsibility courses too theoretical or not theoretical
enough; too removed from the actual context of practice and too
uninformed by interdisciplinary frameworks from history, philosophy, psychology, sociology, economics, and so forth.24 Part of the
problem lies in pressures to structure the course as statutory analysis of ABA codes-a rule-bound conception of legal ethics that has
little to do with ethics.249 Yet students who must pass multiple
choice professional responsibility bar exams often resist alternatives.
In one all too typical case, classmates learned to avoid taking ethics
with a faculty member who "ask[ed] a lot of uncomfortable questions about what you think is right, and never spen[t] any time
teaching- you the rules for the exam.""
246. This history is reviewed in Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42
J. LEGAL EDUc. 31, 33-38 (1992).
247. Dale C. Moss, Out of Balance: Why Can't Law Schools Teach Ethics?, STUDENT
LAW., Oct. 1991, at 19, 19; Rosemary C. Harold, Dilemmas: Ethics Are Lawyers" Biggest
Concern-So Why Isn't There Any Rational Way to Teach Them in Law School?, STUDENT
LAW., Dec. 1989, at 9, 9 (describing conventional student wisdom that "ethics classes are
a joke" and "can be skipped often and without guilt").
248. Rhode, supra note 248, at 41; see also W. BRENT COTTER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INSTRUCTION IN CANADA: A COORDINATED CURRICULUM FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
2-26 (1992); ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM. supra note 93, at 176-87; Ronald M. Pipkin, Law
School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 247, 257-59.
249. William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J.LEGAL EDUc. 65, 65-66

(1991).
250. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Ethos and Conscience-A Rejoinder, 21 CONN. L. REV. 397,
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Not only are there problems in the way professional responsibility is taught, there are even greater problems in the way that it is
not taught. A recent survey of some 130 leading casebooks in
fourteen fields found that the median amount of coverage of ethical
issues was 1.4% of total pages; much of that coverage consisted of
simply reprinting relevant rules.Z t This inattention to ethical questions as they arise in substantive coursework marginalizes the inoral
dimensions of daily practice. Faculty who decline, explicitly or
implicitly, to address such questions encourage future practitioners
to do the same. Curricular priorities are apparent in subtexts as well
as texts-in what is left unsaid as well as said. Too often, students
will view their mandatory course as an add-on, a public relations
digression from what is really important. Every law school does, in
fact, teach some form of ethics by the pervasive method, and pervasive silence speaks louder than formal policies and commenceI
ment platitudes.
A better alternative would be to supplement courses in professional responsibility with more sustained coverage throughout the
curriculum. The aim should be both to broaden and deepen understanding of ethical problems and regulatory responses. We should
not only build awareness of current rules, but also subject them to
.critical scrutiny. More cross-professional, cross-cultural, and crossdisciplinary material could help explore structural causes of ethical
dilemmas and the merits of particular regulatory responses. It is, for
example, possible to foster a critical assessment of the American
bar's sweeping confidentiality obligations by testing their premises
against philosophical critiques and actual experiences of other professional groups.
That is not to overstate the importance of ethical instruction in
shaping ethical behavior. A few classroom hours cannot supplant
what individuals learn over sustained periods from families, peers,
churches, and popular culture. Nor can the best educational experience necessarily counteract the financial and psychological pressures
of practice. But it can increase awareness of their institutional foundations and suggest better regulatory responses. Most research indicates that well-designed ethics courses can improve capacities for
moral reasoning, and that there is some modest relation between
In areas where
moral judgment and moral behavior.'
401 n.23 (1989).
251. Rhode, supra note 246, at 41 & n.52.
252. Id. at 32.
253. James Rest et at., Life Experiences and Developmental Pathways, in MORAL DE-
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professionals' own individual or collective concerns do not coincide
with those of the public, students can benefit from analyzing the
gap. before they have practical reasons to discount its existence.

2. Educational Culture
If we are truly committed to inspiring professional responsibility
during professional training, it is not enough to change the ethics
curriculum. We need also to change our institutions. Each law
school models, or fails to model, professional values along multiple
dimensions, and the ethics it practices are not necessarily those it
professes.
That gap has not gone unnoticed within the legal academy.
Increasing attention has focused on the competitive, confrontational,
and combative atmosphere of professional training and the unduly
adversarial norms that it fosters 4 The- search for knowledge too
often becomes a scramble for status in which participants vie with
each other to impress rather than inform." Little attention centers

on the development of interpersonal or collaborative skills and
alternative dispute resolution.
Current educational approaches can also be corrosive in other
respects. The impersonality and abstraction of large classroom settings, the relative inattention to lawyering skills, the lack of focus

VELOPMENT: ADVANCES iN RESEARCH AND THEORY 28, 31-42 (James R. Rest ed., 1986)

[hereinafter MORAL DEVELOPMENT]; James R. Rest & Stephen J. Thoma, Educational
Programs and Interventions, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 59-78; Walter Mischel &
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in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 84, 101-07; James R. Rest, DEVELOPMENT INJUDOING
MORAL IssuEs (1979) (summarizing studies that find a correlation between stages of moral
reasoning and experimental measures of behavior such as cheating, promise keeping, and
susceptibility to group pressure, as well as "naturalistic" measures of behavior such as
delinquency and professional performance ratings); Augusta Blasi, Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of the Literature, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 37
(1980) (concluding that most recent studies suggest a correlation between developmental
stages in moral reasoning and altruism, honesty, and resistance to peer pressure); James R.
Rest, Morality, in Cognitive Development, 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 556-629

(Paul H. Mussen ed., 1983) (overview of moral development literature); Stephen J. Thoma
et al., Moral Judgment Behavior, Decision Making, and Attitudes, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 133-75 (summarizing studies finding correlation between moral
judgment and behavior).
254. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and
Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988);
Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 247 (1978).
255. Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1547 (1993).
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on real clients with real problems, the insensitivity to racial, ethnic,
and gender bias, and the unwillingness of most institutions to require pro bono service, all send a message about professional responsibility that no required course can counteract." Faced with
a steady succession of hard cases and unstable distinctions, students
quickly learn that "there are no answers but just arguments."
"Thinking like a lawyer" too often translates into suspension of
judgment: The result is agnosticism, relativism, or cynicism, and a
retreat into role that denies personal responsibility for professional
choices.
These are not new laments. Nor is there any lack of alternative
educational models. We know that the most effective ways of
teaching moral analysis and encouraging altruistic conduct are
through more cooperative, interactive learning processes."8 We
also know that clinics and pro bono programs provide some of the
only opportunities for many students to encounter the legal world
inhabited by the have-nots and to cope with ethical issues in realistic practice sellings. What we need is a commitment of resources
that will make more of these educational opportunities available.
That commitment must extend beyond the law schools. The
only realistic way of building consensus for change is through
education that is conceived as a process, not a credential. We urgently need continuing legal education, but not in the watered down
form that current mandatory programs demand. 9 What could
make more of a difference are sustained opportunities for dialogue
in smaller, practice-specific settings where lawyers can talk seriously about ethical dilemmas and the structures that create them.

256. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983) (discussing abstraction and authoritarian structures);
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small number of pro bono requirements and the failure to include faculty).
257. Stewart Macauley, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes
on Two Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 524 (1982); see also
KENNEDY, supra note 256, at 20-21.
258. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 385, 416-17 (1992); Rhode, supra note 246, at 46-47. See generally HowARD

LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER (1992).
259. The minimal number of hours required, the absence of any examination for partici-
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CONCLUSION

This Essay has skimmed many surfaces. That strategy was
deliberate, since occasions for such an overview are all too infrequent. Conventional conversations about professionalism tend to
alternate between sweeping descriptions of "the problem" and extremely limited proposals to address it. That mismatch is hardly
surprising. Lawyers as a group are diverse, divided, and anything
but disinterested on matters affecting self-regulation. The politics of
professional reform make it far easier to invoke abstract ideals than
to invite the costs and conflicts of implementation. But more could
be accomplished if a greater number of lawyers, individually and
collectively, acknowledged that fact and openly confronted the
barriers to effective reform.
That objective is hardly unrealistic. No occupational group in
American history has a more distinguished tradition of leadership in
the struggle for social justice. On matters not involving its own
regulation, the bar has played a critical role in bridging the gap
between ethical ideals and institutional constraints. The challenge
remaining is to turn those talents and traditions inward. Through
that process, we may begin to give greater practical content to
professional aspirations.

